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Title: The Characterization of Civil War: Literary, Numismatic, and Epigraphical 
Presentations of the ‘Year of the Four Emperors’ 
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This thesis analyzes various literary, numismatic, and epigraphical narratives of 
the Roman civil war of 69CE, and the representations of the four emperors who fought in 
it. In particular the focus is on how the narratives and representations relate to one 
another. Such an investigation provides us with useful insight into the people and events 
of 69 and how contemporaries viewed the actors and the events. These various 
presentations, most notably the works of five ancient historians and biographers, give 69 
the distinction of being one of the best documented years in all antiquity. Historical 
scholarship has typically sought to determine which of these authors was the most 
accurate on the points which they disagreed. These points of difference, largely 
subjective opinion and therefore equally valid, illuminate instead the diverse ways in 
which an event can be interpreted. This thesis will focus on why there is such diversity 
and its usefulness to the historian. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 What is the character of someone or something? Ask that question to anyone and 
you will get a variety of descriptive phrases about whatever you indicated. Some 
character traits are quantifiable: a person’s height, a flower’s color, the nature of the 
terrain, when an event took place, etc. But what of such intangibles as personality, 
motivation, or cause? These subjective modes of characterization vary considerably 
between different observers, depending on their point of view and their relationship with 
the person or event described, even for a common person or event. 
 The year 69CE provides us with a wealth of striking events, dynamic people, and 
literate observers whose works have, fortunately, survived.1 This so called ‘long year’ 
saw both a brutal civil war in the Roman world and the recognition of four different men 
as Princeps, or emperor, events which gave rise to the other epithet for 69, ‘the year of 
the four emperors.’2 Yet it is for more than the events of the year, which included two 
large battles between Roman legions, the violent deaths of three emperors, two by the 
mob and one by his own hands, and the burning of the Temple of Jupiter Optimus 
Maximus, that 69 can be identified as ‘the long year.’ The year 69 also holds the 
distinction of being the one in all antiquity about which we have the most detailed 
information.3 This is largely due to the writings of five different extant writers who dealt 
                                                 
1
 All dates are CE unless otherwise noted. 
 
2
 The appropriate title is ‘princeps’ and that of the system of government the ‘principate’, however 
the terms emperor and empire may safely be used as it conveys an accurate understanding of the position, 
especially as it had evolved by the year 69. 
 
3
 Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, The early Principate: Augustus to Trajan. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982), 15; P.A.L. Greenhalgh, The Year of the Four Emperors (New York: Barnes & Nobles Books, 
1975), xi-xii. 
 2
with various aspects of the year: Josephus, Plutarch, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio. 
Between these works and a variety of coins and inscriptions we can decipher, often with 
no more than a few days uncertainty, the events of this civil war throughout the entire 
year on a level of detail that is impossible for any year before 69, or for many years 
after.4 This wealth of information includes details about a number of colorful characters. 
 This is where the issue of characterization comes in. Each of the five authors 
presented his own version of the events of 69 and the characters involved, and while they 
agreed on general facts, their opinions differ. Scholars have spent much effort 
determining which of these authors was, both in general and in given situations, the ‘most 
accurate’ in his characterization. However, because characterization is at least partly 
subjective, the fact that one account seems less biased or more balanced does not 
necessarily make it either more or less accurate than another. All we can say for certain is 
what each author thought of the person or event in question.5 In fact, these authors’ 
presentations of character and the choices they made in depicting character tell us as 
much about the author in question as about the event itself, thus giving insight into what 
certain groups of people thought and felt about this event at the time of writing. 
 The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to look at the way four of these five 
authors characterized the people and events of 69 both individually and in comparison 
with one another in order to determine both where the accounts differ and why they do. It 
will also study a sample of the coins and inscriptions dating either from 69 or concerning 
major participants in events in order to get a glimpse of how the people involved wanted 
                                                 
4
 Charles L. Murison, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies (New York: G. Olms 
Verlag, 1993), 93-94. 
 
5
 A.J. Woodman, Tacitus Reviewed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 5-7. 
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to represent the events in which they participated as well as themselves. This comparative 
study will help us gain insight into the ways in which these authors are useful in studying 
the events and the characters of the year 69 and contributes to our understanding of how 
they represented other years as well. Usefulness here is each author’s distinct viewpoint 
which determined how they characterized both specific people and matters in general. By 
studying each text on its own, in relation to others, and in light of what is known of the 
author it is possible to sketch each author’s point of view. It is impossible, as Dr. Hayden 
White noted, to determine which of these view-points is ‘true’ as ‘truth’ cannot be 
recovered. However, each author’s depiction can be said to be ‘real’ in that they wrote 
their characters the way they perceived them to be.6 Such viewpoints highlight the 
multitude of ways which the people and events of 69 could be, and were, seen. This in 
turn gives both a more detailed depiction of 69 and a sampling of the complexity of 
Roman society. This thesis’s focus is on fleshing out those various viewpoints. 
 Of the five authors, Cassius Dio will not be covered here. Although Cassius Dio 
had his own opinions on the year 69, opinions worth studying, there are two particular 
reasons why this study omits him.7 The first is that Cassius Dio wrote some 150 years 
after the events of 69, having lived through a Roman civil war much longer and more 
violent than the one of 69. While his having lived through a civil war no doubt gave him 
the ability to comment on another such event in Rome’s history, and he did use, and 
occasionally cite, the same sources as the other authors, this temporal distance isolates 
him from the other authors studied here, all of whom were contemporaries or near-
                                                 
6
 Hayden White, “Introduction: Historical Fiction, Fictional History, and Historical Reality,” 
Rethinking History 9(2005): 147-157. 
 
7
 Fergus Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1964), 5-7, 13. 
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contemporaries of events and thus reacted immediately to them. The second and more 
important reason is that the section of Cassius Dio that dealt with 69 exists only in a 
Byzantine epitomy.8 These condensations and summarizations, produced a thousand 
years after the fact, raise a large array of questions about what Cassius Dio actually wrote 
and thought which are simply beyond the scope of this thesis.9 There are other writers 
who dealt with the civil war. However their work either exists only in fragments, such as 
Pliny the Elder who was a possible source for the other writers, or they only make 
mention of the war rather than give a detailed depiction, as does Pliny the Younger. Since 
these authors neither provide a comprehensive view-point on 69 nor represent a broad 
presentation or perception, as the coins and inscriptions, such authors will not be dealt 
with here. 
The first chapter of this thesis deals with a small sampling of coins from 69 and 
inscriptions concerning the people involved in the events of that year. Both coins and 
inscriptions provide us with a more ‘on the ground’ look at the events than is provided by 
the literary sources. However, since both coins and inscriptions were used for generations 
as a means of propaganda and often followed set patterns, it is not enough to look solely 
at what the emperor and others were putting on these coins and inscribing in stone or 
other materials, but rather at how such things changed during, and as a result of, the civil 
war of 69. This will demonstrate the broader political and social changes that resulted 
from the civil war and give us some idea what influence the war might have had. This 
                                                 
8
 Millar, Cassius Dio, 2 
 
9
 Charles L. Murison, Rebellion and Reconstruction: Galba to Domitian (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1999), 1-2; Murison, Galba Otho and Vitellius, 18-19; Simon Swain, “Biography and Biographic Literature 
of the Roman Empire” in Portraits ed. by M.J. Edwards and Simon Swain. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), 25 
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chapter is being presented first because this material evidence was contemporary to the 
events and people we are discussing and many of the ideas present on the coins and in the 
inscriptions make up part of the later characterization by the authors that we are 
discussing. 
 The second chapter covers the Roman historian Tacitus (56-117). While Josephus 
and Plutarch dealt with the subject first, Tacitus’ depiction of the civil war is far more 
detailed. In fact, the first three books of his Histories, which cover 69, are the most 
detailed running narrative in antiquity.10 This chapter delves into how Tacitus constructed 
character and ways of interpreting his strong judgments and biases in order to establish 
Tacitus’ viewpoint on the civil war, a perspective as cynical and senatorial as it was 
complex. It is because of Tacitus’ complexity that he is to be dealt with on his own and 
because of his expansiveness that he will be used as a basis of comparison for the other 
authors. 
 The third chapter deals with the Jewish Historian Josephus (37-100). Josephus 
both lived through and was an active participant in the civil war of 69. His account, part 
of his Bellum Iudaicum, was published roughly a decade after the war, although the 
Roman civil war is not the focus of the work. This chapter examines how Josephus 
characterized Vespasian, his patron and the victor of the civil war, and Vitellius, the man 
Vespasian defeated, in particular. Josephus’ characterization will be compared to Tacitus’ 
treatment of these two emperors. The aim here is to determine how Josephus’ close 
proximity to the event affected his account and the degree to which it could be seen as 
                                                 
10
 Rhiannon Ash, Ordering Anarchy: armies and leaders in Tacitus’ Histories. (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999), vii 
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representing the Flavian narrative of the war, aimed at giving legitimacy to Vespasian’s 
new dynasty. 
 The fourth chapter covers Plutarch’s biographies of Galba and Otho. Plutarch also 
lived through the events of 69, although he was young at the time. His status as a 
biographer means that his focus was, even more so than that of Tacitus and Josephus, on 
the characters of these emperors. Looking at his work in comparison with Tacitus’ 
Histories will bring to light ways in which Plutarch’s being a highly educated provincial 
who chose biography as a genre shaped the way he presented the character of those two 
emperors (as well as the soldiery, on which Plutarch has some notable opinions). This 
chapter will reveal the inherent philosophical and moral nature of Plutarch’s viewpoint. 
 The final chapter treats the biographies of all four emperors by Suetonius. 
Suetonius was born shortly after 69, his father having participated in the war. His 
biographies, even more so than Plutarch’s, focus solely on the characters of the emperors. 
These biographies will be compared with Tacitus’ Histories, for the ways in which 
Suetonius differs from his immediate Roman predecessor, and with Plutarch’s 
biographies, for his differences with his biographical precursor. These comparisons will 
flesh out Suetonius’ less overtly judgmental, more tightly and action focused, and 
equestrian viewpoint on the four emperors.. 
 The conclusion of this thesis offers a final, comprehensive look at the viewpoints 
of each of these authors, as well as the numismatic and epigraphical evidence, and the 
ways in which these viewpoints affected how those authors characterized the civil war of 
69. Taken together their viewpoints provide us with a multi-faceted portrait of the civil 
war of 69 and an invaluable glimpse into the complex world in which these authors lived. 
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CHAPTER II 
COINS AND INSCRIPTIONS 
If one is interested in how people and events are characterized in Roman history 
one is likely to turn to the literary works, contemporary if possible, which deal with that 
topic such as the ones mentioned in the introduction. Since they wished to present their 
particular views these authors gave usually clear, often coherent, and frequently eloquent 
pictures of the people and events they studied. Naturally these depictions are often 
questioned, as we will do in the proceeding chapters, for what exactly the author’s view 
was, his biases, and his sources. Nevertheless, these depictions give a good and useful, as 
this thesis will later demonstrate, look at the past based on what one is hoping to gain 
from reading them. However, this is not the only way of getting at the characterization of 
these people and events. 
Coins and inscriptions also provide us with a wealth of information about various 
people and events throughout Roman history. These types of sources give a view on 
things that is often more ‘on the ground’ and contemporary to the person or event in 
question than one finds in the surviving literary texts. On the other hand, the vast 
majority of what survives of coins, as well as official inscriptions, was produced by the 
Principate itself.11 While much of this numismatic and epigraphical material was likely 
produced to disseminate what we might call propaganda, or to build legitimacy for the 
regime, this does not diminish its usefulness. After all, studying the way in which a 
Princeps characterized, or at least attempted to characterize, himself or an event is just as 
valid as that of any other author; and the biases are often easier to decipher. This chapter, 
therefore, will look at the coins and inscriptions which pertain to the civil war of 69CE 
                                                 
11
 A great many inscriptions were either locally or privately produced 
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and the people who participated in it. The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, it will 
examine how these coins and inscriptions characterized the events and people of the civil 
war. Second, these materials will be used to sketch out how this civil war might have 
altered Roman social and political life, with a particular eye to how this may have 
affected the viewpoints of the authors we shall be dealing with later in this thesis. It is for 
this reason, and because this is the closest one can get to a contemporary characterization, 
that these sources are being dealt with first. 
While both coins and inscriptions provide messages that people were meant to see 
by way of specific phrases, ideas, images, and associations, it is not sufficient for the 
purposes of this chapter to study only these messages. Leaving aside the common issues 
of who saw these messages, who could read them, and whether or not they understood 
what was being communicated, the problem is that this method for disseminating 
information had become an institution by the year 69. The use of coins and inscriptions to 
convey specific ideas predates Augustus, who served to standardize the practice and 
many of the images and slogans on coins. The formula for official inscriptions also often 
stayed the same from one reign to the next. Therefore, it is far more helpful in dealing 
with characterization to look at whether the messages from coins and official inscriptions 
changed during the civil war of 69, and afterwards, and if so in what way. Where there is 
change then one can claim that a new message, or characterization, was being put 
forward. Where there is continuity then the question becomes continuity with what. If the 
continuity is with the immediate predecessors then the message was perhaps standard 
formula or simply being reused for the sake of time and cost. If the continuity harkens 
back to an earlier reign, or a Republican or Greek precedent, then the characterization 
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linked the sitting Princeps with that predecessor in order to create, or recreate, a new 
ideology. 
Coins: Continuity and Change 
 Since before the time of Augustus coins had been used as a means of propaganda. 
Various deities, allegorical personifications, and various stock phrases were used to 
promote the image of the one who ordered the coins to be minted.12 This was generally 
done on the occasion of important events such as military triumphs and the like. 
Augustus began the process of regularizing the minting of coins, bringing it under the 
control of the Principate, and the process, eventually completed under Vespasian, of 
bringing the mints to Rome, although some remained independent in the East.13  
 Because of the limited space on a coin there was only so much that could be 
written on them. This is why a variety of stock phrases and depictions evolved for use on 
coins, many of which had long established meanings.14 It is for this reason that, despite 
the large number of coins we have from 69, we will be looking at the ways in which the 
coins minted by the four emperors were new and in what ways they related back to those 
minted previously. As already noted incidences in which an image or idea is new indicate 
some change in thought or an attempt to make a break from the past, whereas when the 
image or idea harkens back, that means either that the new coin is a simple recopying of 
an old coin, or that the new emperor was trying to evoke a connection with the emperor 
who had used that type of image or idea.15 It is unfortunate that only around 1% of coins 
                                                 
12
 Grant, Twelve Caesars, 11-17. 
 
13
 C.H.V. Sutherland, Roman Coins (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1974), 129-32, 159-69. 
 
14
 Grant, Twelve Caesars, 12-17. 
 
15
 This is operating on the assumption, impossible to prove, that the administration was aware of 
tradition and was consciously manipulating it. 
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minted are estimated to have survived, thus adding new problems, beyond the scope of 
this chapter, to drawing conclusions from these coins.16 
 There are a few things that should be mentioned briefly before moving on to 
discuss the coins themselves. The first is that we do not know whose decision it was to 
design the coins. Since the mints were under the direct control of the Princeps this paper 
will address the minter of the coins as emperor/Princeps for the sake of simplicity, since 
whoever was in charge of the design and minting of coins was clearly doing so on behalf 
of the regime.17 There is no real way of being sure of either what ideas the emperor 
intended people to draw from the coins or what they did draw from the coins. 
Nevertheless, since every emperor minted coins, especially ones needing legitimacy such 
as the four emperors of 69, indicates that this was perceived to be an effective means of 
spreading ideas. This is further proven by the fact that the Romans minted coins for 
ceremonial occasions such as a triumphs, the ascension of an emperor, or as needed to 
pay the army, which means that for them coins were more of an ideological tool than a 
means of keeping the economy functioning.18 This is best illustrated by the fact that 
towards the end of Tiberius’ reign there was a shortage of coins, because he had minted 
only in small quantities since the beginning of his reign.19 
 Now let us look at the coins produced by the four emperors of 69. In June of 68 
Nero died by his own hands leaving the 73 year old Galba, a man of old senatorial 
                                                 
16
 Sutherland, Roman Coins, 137; C.M. Kraay, The Aes Coinage of Galba (New York: The 
American Numismatic Society, 1956), 5-6. 
 
17
 C.H.V. Sutherland, The Emperor and the Coinage (London: Spink and Son LTD, 1976), 11-13, 
34-35. 
 
18
 Sutherland, Roman Coins, 139-40. 
 
19
 Sutherland, Roman Coins, 169. 
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standing, as Emperor of Rome and in control of a series of mints in Rome and Gaul that 
had been refined in their skill and artistry by Nero.20 Before Galba was declared Emperor, 
he had already struck a number of coins in Spain, where he was governor, declaring his 
intentions in rebellion.21 These coins bore such unique legends as Concordia 
Provinciarum, Roma Renascens, Libertas, and even Eid. Mar.22 These coins, primarily 
Denarii and used to pay the army that Galba was raising, clearly demonstrated to the 
soldiers that Galba, and his ally Vindex, intended to kill Nero and restore the government 
to working order.23 While many of the core ideas, those of ‘Concord’, ‘Rome’, and 
‘Liberty’ had been used frequently by previous emperors, the ways in which they were 
being used were original to Galba.24 This is understandable given that this was the first 
well organized civil war against the Julio-Claudian house, and thus it makes sense that 
they would take the old ideas that had long appeared on coins and put them to new uses 
in order to communicate their intentions. Galba and Vindex certainly were not advocating 
the return of the Republic, but rather using Republican imagery to convey the idea that 
when they succeeded, Bon Event, then Rome would be restored, Roma Renascens, as on 
one rare coin.25 This is best demonstrated by the fact that Libertas and Eid Mar where on 
opposite sides of the same coin. This harkens back to the death of Nero’s ancestor Julius 
                                                 
20
 Sutherland, Roman Coins, 174-75. 
 
21
 Sutherland, Roman Coins, ibid. 
 
22
 Sutherland, Roman Coins, ibid; BMCRE, 184, 7. 
 
23
 Ibid 
 
24
 F. Gnecchi and G. Elmer, The Coin-types of Imperial Rome.(Chicago: Ares Publishers Inc., 
1978(exact reprint of the 1908 original)), 8-9, 29-30. 
 
25
 C.H.V. Sutherland, The Roman Imperial Coinage vol. 1 ed. C.H.V. Sutherland and R.A.G. 
Carson (London: Sprink and Son ltd. 1984(2nd edition)), 198-99. 
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Caesar, and shows clearly that Galba was rebelling for liberty and to defeat tyranny 
which was, in his view, what Nero’s reign had become.26 
 Once Galba had gained control over Rome, the coinage he produced, which was 
in massive quantities in all denominations, continued to be in some ways 
unprecedented.27 To begin with we will look at those coins which reflected what had 
come before, both from Nero and from earlier emperors. Depictions of Ceres, Roma, or 
Vesta as well as the ideas of Concordia Provinciarum, Libertas, Salus, Securitas, and 
Victoria had all been used under Nero, though Securitas is the only one that was 
originated by Nero.28 This similarity can be traced to two things. First, Galba inherited 
Nero’s mints and these were ideas for which the mints probably already had dies for. The 
other reason was the need for Galba to gain legitimacy for his new dynasty. For example, 
all coins minted in the province and the gold and silver minted in Rome bare virtually all 
of the Concordia Provinciarum, Salus, and Victoria legends, since these coins would 
have been used to pay Galba’s soldiers and imperial administrators they represent him 
acknowledging his power base, namely the provinces.29 The bronze coinage in Rome, on 
the other hand, bares such legends as Libertas and Pax most consistently, showing 
Galba’s endeavor to gain support among the common people of Rome.30 This 
demonstrates Galba’s desire to be seen as a restorer of peace, liberty, and good 
government to Rome after Nero’s reign, an idea also conveyed in the Lex de Imperio 
                                                 
26
 Sutherland, Roman Coins, 174-175. 
 
27
 Sutherland, Roman Coins, 174-175; Gnecchi, Elmer 8-9, 29-30, 42 
 
28
 Gnecchi and Elmer, The Coin-types of Imperial Rome, 8-9, 29-30, 50, 58-60. 
 
29
 Sutherland, The Roman Imperial Coinage, 216-232. 
 
30
 ibid 
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Vespasiani. Other coins of Galba’s which harkened back to earlier times are ones 
showing images such as Fortuna and Providentia, which had not been used since 
Augustus and Tiberius, and Pax, which was employed by Augustus and Claudius.31 The 
ideas of fortune and providence were likely an attempt by Galba to link himself to 
Augustus and the similar fortune that allowed them to succeed in civil war and become 
masters of the Roman World. The Providentia coins are also all aes, meaning Galba was 
trying to associate himself with this idea for the common people. Given that Pax was 
used on coins by Augustus after the long civil war that ended the Republic and by 
Claudius after the disruptive reign of Caligula, these coins conveyed a similar message, 
to Rome specifically as noted above, that peace was restored after a troubled time. 
 The ideas on Galba’s coins that were original to him are far more interesting to 
study. Galba was the first to make use of the god Aesculapius on his coinage, by which 
he portrayed himself the healer of a Roman state sick from Nero’s corruption.32 Galba 
also made use of such ideas as Aequitas, Felicitas, Fides, Honos, and Virtus on his coins. 
Of which Aequitas is rare and found on Roman aes and provincial coins as is the more 
common Virtus, Fides only on provincial coins, and Honos and Felicitas is found only in 
Rome on aes.33 While ‘felicity’ is something that Galba certainly connected with himself, 
given his successful service to all of the Julio-Claudian emperors, the rest are clear 
statements of what Galba stood for. ‘Equality’ and ‘faith’ are ideas that connect well with 
Galba’s stated aim of restoring balance and good operation to the Roman state, and 
                                                 
31
 Gnecchi and Elmer, The Coin-types of Imperial Rome, 8-9, 29-30, 53-54, 56-57. 
 
32
 Gnecchi and Elmer, The Coin-types of Imperial Rome, 8-9, 16, 29-30. 
 
33
 Gnecchi and Elmer, The Coin-types of Imperial Rome, 8-9, 29-30, 43-44, 46; BMCRE, 375; 
Sutherland, The Roman Imperial Coinage, 116-131. 
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‘honor’ and ‘virtue’ were the personal characteristics Galba most closely associated with 
himself.34 After the corrupt reign of Nero the Aequitas coins likely represented ‘fair-
dealing’ by the government.35 With the evidence of Galba’s coinage we can construct a 
very clear picture of what was a notable change in the messages presented on coins, 
driven by the needs of the civil war that Galba had led against Nero and which brought 
him to the Principate and the concurrent need to establish legitimacy. 
 If Galba’s coinage marked a notable change in content and message, the coins that 
were minted by Otho did the exact opposite. In part this might be because Otho did not 
mint any aes coinage, the kind which would be seen by the common people most often, 
because of the vast surplus of such coins in circulation from both Nero and Galba.36 The 
fact of the civil war also meant that Otho needed to strike coinage for his soldiers, 
meaning gold and silver was needed, and thus most of the messages were likely directed 
at them. All coins minted in Otho’s name are from Rome.37 There is also the fact that 
Otho was in power for the shortest time of all the emperors of 69, and spent much of that 
time dealing with the problems associated with the rebellion of Vitellius.38 Of all of the 
legends from Otho’s coins the only one that was not also used by Nero was that of Pax, 
specifically Pax Orbis Terrarum, likely due to the turmoil with which his reign began, 
and it has been theorized by Mattingly that this might have been Otho’s ‘official 
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slogan’.39 There are two likely reasons for this lack of change brought on by Otho. First 
was that he wished to associate himself with Nero and thus used many of the same 
messages and ideas as he did. Second is that according to our literary sources Otho 
wished to appear moderate and conform to the standards of the office, rather than 
appearing radical or innovative.40 Both reasons indicate that Otho was endeavoring to 
build legitimacy by both linking himself to Nero, who was popular with the common 
people, and presenting himself as a tradition emperor. 
 While the coinage of Vitellius was not, in itself, particularly innovative, it did 
make good use both of long used associations of the Roman emperors and suggested the 
ideas Galba used on his coins during his initial rebellion.41 In the first case, much as with 
Otho, a large portion of Vitellius’ coins harkened back to ideas that were employed on 
the coinage of Nero, such as those of Annona, Concordia, Roma, and Victoria, although 
there was some decline in quality.42 In that Vitellius was rebelling against the recognized 
Princeps in Rome he also made good use of such ideas as Libertas Restituta and Roma 
Renascens before he had succeeded in his civil war against Otho. Minted in Spain or 
Gaul and directed toward the soldiers in order to keep their support, this legend was also 
used in small quantities in Rome while Vitellius ruled.43 This deliberate harkening back 
to the coinage of Galba invokes many of the same ideas, that the princeps in Rome was 
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corrupt and that Vitellius’ mission was to cleanse the Roman state of that corruption 
signaling that the ideas used by Galba in 68 had already become widely known.44 
 There were, however, two changes made by Vitellius during his time as emperor. 
The first is one of focus and the second a major innovation. The change in focus was the 
large amount of coins that Vitellius had minted, both before and after taking control of 
Rome, of Consensus and Fides Exercitum. 45 This was done in recognition of the fact that 
it was the army that had brought Vitellius to the Principate, a fact previous emperors 
largely played down; for example Galba used Consensus but identified the provinces 
which supported him.46 The first of these legends is perhaps ironic in that Vitellius both 
came to power and lost it in a major civil war, which shows that he did not have the 
‘consensus’ of the army, but these coins still demonstrate clearly that the Rhine legions 
were Vitellius’ base of power and, since newly minted coins were often distributed to the 
legions as pay, the message was likely meant for them.47 The innovation, however, was 
the fact that Vitellius was the first to make heavy use of portraits of his father, a famous 
senator, and his children on the coins that he minted.48 This change reflects both 
Vitellius’ claim to fame and that he could provide Rome with a stable succession. This 
innovation demonstrates the importance of dynasty for gaining legitimacy and ensuring 
stability, hence why this coin appeared both in Rome and in the provinces.49 Thus in 
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Vitellius one might almost see a mixture of both Otho and Galba. Like Otho he harkened 
back to previous emperors to gain support for himself, but like Galba he made some 
changes to his coinage both to reflect how he came to power and also to gain support for 
the dynasty that he was trying to create. 
 With Vespasian the civil war of 69 finally came to an end. While the Flavian 
dynasty lasted only 25 years the changes made to how coinage was produced would last 
for centuries.50 One of the biggest changes was that coins began to be minted every year 
and the range of messages on the coins was standardized as well.51 Many of the coins of 
Vespasian’s immediate predecessors were used and several ideas such as Fortuna, Spes, 
Juno, and Minerva, which had once been well used but had fallen out of favor in recent 
reigns, were brought back into use.52 Vespasian, like Vitellius, had portraits of his sons 
on a great many of the coins that he had minted, starting quite early in his reign in order 
to gain legitimacy and ensure a stable dynastic succession. This became standardized 
practice for another century since dynastic succession was seen as the best way of 
securing peace. The mints were centralized in Rome, and this stricter control served the 
purposes of Vespasian and the Flavians of restoring the damage of the civil war upon the 
Roman Empire as well as allowing the Princeps firmer control upon it.53 Thus one can 
see, the messages placed upon coins were in great flux as a result of the civil war of 68-
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69 until finally being stabilized by the victorious Vespasian, who, much as his 
predecessors, used old models and made innovations, as was the case with much else in 
the Roman world. 
Inscriptions: a shift in government 
 Inscriptions, etched and inscribed into stone, bronze, or any other material was 
perhaps the most common method of disseminating information from the beginnings of 
writing until the printing press came into wide use. We have a great number of 
inscriptions from all levels of Roman society, and these sources give us an often intimate 
look at the intricacies of Roman politics and society that is often not possible from other 
sources.54 While there were certainly a large number of official inscriptions from the 
Principate, unlike with coins the emperor did not have a monopoly on inscriptions. Thus 
coins give us some good insight into the shifts of government ideas and policy, and 
inscriptions give us a view of the changes and shifts in Roman politics and society. 
 Unfortunately, unlike with coins, we do not have any inscriptions from Galba, 
Otho, or Vitellius. In part this is because, much as with coins, only a very small 
percentage of inscriptions are thought to still exist so it is hard to draw some conclusions 
about the existence of certain inscriptions.55 There is also the possibility that, as losers of 
a civil war, all three suffered from damnatio memoria, or the deliberate removal of all of 
their statues and inscriptions from public places.56 This process, well attested in the 
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literary evidence, would explains this absence of inscriptions from the first three 
emperors of 69, since a great many of the inscriptions were likely destroyed by those that 
succeeded them.57 There is also the fact that none of them ruled long enough to leave 
much in the first place. This section will first look at two specific inscriptions, the Lex de 
Imperio Vespasiani and a section of the Acta Fratrum Arvalium from 69, for the ways in 
which past and precedent were invoked and for several specific reactions to the events of 
69. Then we shall move on to looking at the data which both the AFA and a series of 
career inscriptions provide us on the degree to which the civil war marked a shift in 
Roman politics, which may well have had some bearing on how the event was perceived. 
 The Lex de Imperio Vespasiani is a bronze tablet inscription, currently found in 
the Capitoline museum, which is the end of a longer inscription that detailed the full 
powers granted to Vespasian at his ascension to the empire and is probably dateable to 
early 70.58 This document raises a number of issues including whether this is the only 
time such a law was passed, whether these powers were unique to Vespasian or had been 
standard from before, and whether it was standard practice for such powers to be 
conferred by ‘the people’ or this was a unique situation.59 If not standard before 69 it is 
likely that the rapid succession on rulers created the formula given in this lex. Of interest 
also is that despite the fact that it is called a lex, this is in the form of a Senatus 
Consultum, and may represent the Senate’s attempt to reestablish its role as the granter of 
imperial power after the civil war.60  
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However, this is not our main focus, instead we will take a brief look at the way 
that this inscription calls upon the past and deals with the civil war. This inscription 
makes repeated use of phrases like “ita uti licuit divo Aug., Ti. Iulio Caesari Aug. 
Tiberioque Claudio Caesari Aug. Germanico.”61 Even though all eight of the emperors 
who preceded Vespasian likely held the powers here being granted to Vespasian, this 
document only calls upon the precedent of Augustus, Tiberius, and Claudius.62 This 
doubtlessly deliberate omission even removed several emperors that Vespasian and his 
party would not have had any grievances against. But the specter of civil war, and the 
widespread unrest that it caused, probably made it beneficial to the Flavian Party to leave 
those emperors out as well so as not to be seen as calling back to a bad example.63 This 
also means that Vespasian’s party was calling back to three emperors widely recognized 
as good and thus can be seen as communicating the hope that Vespasian would reign in a 
method akin to those men, rather than the unpopular, with the Senate, emperors that had 
preceded Vespasian.64  
Another part of this law that has some reflection on the civil war is, “utique quae 
ante hanc legem rogatam acta gesta decreta imperata ab imperatore Caesare Vespasiano 
Aug. iussu mandatuve eius quoque sunt, ea perinde iusta rataq. sint ac si populi plebisve 
iussu acta essent.”65 While such provisions were a common part of the granting of powers 
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to a new Princeps, given that there would always been some time between the Princeps 
assuming the position and when the senate and assembly could meet, most previous 
emperors had not come to power through the aegis of civil war.66 While the main part of 
this passage served to absolve Vespasian for having declared himself emperor by 
declaring anything he had done ante hanc legem rogatam ‘before the law was passed’, it 
also provided retroactive absolution for Vespasian’s generals, who actually fought the 
war iussu mandatuve eius quoque sunt ‘at his command’. Thus this law can be seen as 
giving Vespasian retroactive legitimation for having fought the civil war.67 
The Acta Fratrum Arvalium is a series of inscriptions from the Arval Brethren, an 
ancient priesthood revived by Augustus whose purpose was to offer prayer for the 
preservation of the Roman State and of the Emperor, who was also the head of the 
college. While the record is fragmentary as a whole it does provide a number of very 
telling points of information for the events of 69, for the early months of which we have a 
large chunk of the minutes of their meetings. “Isdem cos. pr. idus Mart. vota nu(n)cupato 
pro s(al)ute et reditu [Vitelli] Germanici imp., preaeeunt L. Maecio Postumo, mag. 
[Vitelli] Germanici imp.”68 The first interesting thing to note is that on March 14th Otho 
was the recognized emperor in Rome and thus the Arval Brethren, over which Otho 
would have had control, would have been offering prayers for his safe return as he went 
out to fight Vitellius.69 That the inscription actually says Germanici indicates that by the 
time this inscription was actually put up, Otho was dead and Vitellius was master of 
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Rome and thus it was wise to fudge the record to make it appear as though Vitellius had 
been supported all along.70 The other interesting thing to note is that the reason Vitellius 
name is in brackets is because his name is missing from the inscription itself, having been 
scratched out. This indicates that when Vitellius died someone thought it necessary to 
chisel out his name, possibly to gain favor with the new Flavian dynasty.71 
Having looked at these two individual inscriptions we will now turn our attention 
to what information may be gathered from the group of inscriptions we have from the 
Vespasian period. To do so we will look at the official and provincial inscriptions, career 
inscriptions and the list of provincial governors, and the AFA again. The purpose here is 
to determine if there was a particular shift in these inscriptions, as there was with the 
coinage, which could tell us something about the character of the civil war of 69. 
Of official inscriptions there is little that can really be said as there are too few of 
them that exist and those that do are of a traditional nature, either the emperor paying 
respect to someone or someone paying a dedication to the emperor. The only thing of 
particular note is the emphasis put in these inscriptions on Vespasian’s family. His sonsm 
specifically Titus, were often named along with him in honor, a precedent established by 
Augustus, and one inscription pays tribute to Flavius Sabinus, a very prominent senator 
and Vespasian’s elder brother who was invaluable in helping Vespasian to the 
Principate.72 There is also not much that can be said about the inscriptions set up in the 
provinces. There is some change apparent here, but it is of a kind that had been slowly 
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happening over the course of the first century as the provinces were gradually 
Romanized.73 
The various career inscriptions, on the other hand, tell a much more interesting 
story. Looking at the list of provincial governors from the years of Vespasian’s reign (69-
79) shows a marked shift in who filled official positions around the empire. A number of 
these governors are from places outside of Italy, making them provincial aristocrats.74 
Men such as M. Ulpius Traianus, Sex. Iulius Frontinus, and M. Vetius Bolanus all appear 
several times on this list of governors which shows that they were men who were not just 
holding a single office but were being used by Vespasian as important parts of governing 
the Roman Empire.75 This change marked a decided demographic shift in Roman politics 
that is reflected in part by the fact that Vespasian himself, while not a provincial, was a 
‘new man.’ He brought a new group of people with him into the Roman government 
which would remain a vital part of it thereafter.76 From this it is possible to see the civil 
war of 69 as something of a social revolution which signaled the importance of the 
provinces, just as the civil war that ended the Republic was also a social revolution that 
brought Italy to importance. In addition freedmen disappeared from the imperial 
bureaucracy, replaced by equites. This idea is supported by the fact that many of the 
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major figures of the following century, such as Tacitus, Suetonius, Juvenil, Statius, 
Trajan, Hadrian, Antonius Pius, Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, were descendent from 
this group.77 
This shift is further confirmed when one looks at the inscriptions of the Arval 
Brethren. A common part of these inscriptions shows who members of the Brethren were 
at any given time. While the inscriptions are incomplete we do know that the brothers 
served for life, so it is not too difficult to get a decent picture of who was appointed to 
that group.78 Since the Brethren were appointed by the emperor, some conclusions can be 
drawn as to what types of people he chose to honor with appointment to this priesthood, 
and by extension who he wished to be supporting and praying for him, that being the 
primary job of the Brethren.79 Much as in the case of career inscriptions there is a decided 
shift towards provincial elites being part of the Brethren, many of whom, whose names 
we recognize, had highly successful political careers.80 In addition to this a number of 
these appointees bear the name of Julius, which indicates that they were the descendants 
of families given citizenship by Augustus or Julius Caesar, another demographic shift 
away from established Roman aristocrats and towards ‘new men’, perhaps inevitable 
given the emperors’ long reliance on freedmen and their descendants.81 It should be noted 
here that the shift here was not a huge one, as provincial ariticrats were still a minority.82 
                                                 
77
 Nicols, Vespasian and the Partes Flavianae, 104, 112-113. 
 
78
 Ronald Syme, Some Arval Brethren (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 2-3. 
 
79
 Syme, Some Arval Brethren, 2-3, 39. 
 
80
 Syme, Some Arval Brethren, 71, 74, 79. 
 
81
 Syme, Some Arval Brethren, 39, 50-55; Hopkins, “Elite Mobility,” 107-09; Wallace-Hadrill, 
“Patronage in Roman Society,” 83. 
 
 25
Therefore, looking at the inscriptions from the Flavian dynasty we can see that 
there is a decided social and demographic shift towards provincial elites and away from 
the old Roman and Italian aristocrats. This shift had begun before Vespasian, and the 
established aristocrats of Rome and Italy still held the majority of positions, but the rise 
of Vespasian marks a decided shift towards the provinces.83 This says quite clearly that 
the provinces were becoming increasingly important in the Roman Empire, which is 
corroborated by the fact that emperors began granting individual provinces more and 
more rights and by the end of the century there was the first provincial emperor in 
Trajan.84 While the fact that this group supported Vespasian no doubt explains their 
sudden jump in political positions during his reign, this shift was perhaps inevitable given 
the increasing levels of Romanization and urbanization in the Provinces.85 
Having seen shifts in both coins and inscriptions as a result of the civil war of 69 
we now look at how these changes might have affected the views people had of the civil 
war. Coins and the notable shifts in how coins were used by the emperors to spread 
messages are reflected in the various literary sources, an idea which will be explored in 
more depth in the following chapters. The ideas, of Galba being a contradiction of both 
disturbance and recalling old virtues, of Otho trying to be proper in his actions but 
perhaps calling back to the wrong precedent, of Vitellius as simply imitating what came 
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before him and being very family oriented, and of Vespasian as a stabilizing and 
regularizing force are all common themes in the literary works which cover 69.86 How 
much these literary works were actually influenced by the coins is another matter, but the 
overall impression given by the coins is definitely there. The social shift seen in the 
inscriptions from Vespasian’s reign might well have influenced how later writers saw the 
war. Of note is that of the four writers who were contemporary to the events of 69 two, 
Josephus and Plutarch, were provincials, although from the more urbanized east, and two 
were from the provincial elite which Vespasian brought to power.87 While one should be 
careful of making concrete conclusions on how this shift affected people’s perceptions of 
the civil war. After all, Tacitus was a ‘new man’ in the Senate and as such was an ardent 
supporter of the Senate and a critic of the Principate. However, all four writers which we 
will deal with in the proceeding chapters did treat the events of 69 and the rise of 
Vespasian as a major shift in Roman politics. They do not say that Vespasian was given 
new or different powers than previous emperors but all point out his status as a ‘new 
man’ and imply that Rome was a different place after his ascension. Thus while it is 
impossible to say to what degree people noticed the shift in the political and social 
structure of the Roman government, it is definite that there was in fact change, and that is 
demonstrated by the coins and inscriptions and corroborated by the literary evidence. 
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CHAPTER III 
TACITUS 
 
 Cornelius Tacitus (ca. 56-117) is the most detailed source we possess on the 
events of 69. He devoted the first three books of his Histories to the events of that year 
and it is for this reason that we are able to construct such a detailed account of the civil 
war.88 Tacitus’ account is invaluable because he reported on many matters that were 
touched upon by no other extant author.89 This level of detail makes Tacitus the logical 
base-line for comparing the various authors that treated this ‘long year.’ 
 There are other reasons why scholars have set Tacitus up as the pre-eminent 
authority on the events of 69, despite his being neither the first to treat the subject, nor a 
confirmed eye-witness or participant. They generally argue that Tacitus was superior to 
the other authors as both historian and writer. While the claim that Tacitus was the 
greatest prose stylist of this collection of authors is widely accepted, and is my 
conclusion as well, it is irrelevant to this topic of discussion. That Tacitus was the greater 
historian is also generally accepted and seems likely, but that is not what this thesis is 
endeavoring to prove. The purpose here is not to determine which of these sources is the 
‘most accurate’ or the ‘best’ but rather to study how the characterizations presented by 
these sources differ from each other and what the usefulness of each account is. Indeed, 
for matters such as character, based as much on subjective judgment as anything else, 
there is no way of telling which author is ‘correct’ if any of them were.90 Therefore, this 
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chapter will explore Tacitus’ viewpoint on the subject of 69 and will demonstrate how 
this mode of characterization, distinctly senatorial and cynical, both distinguishes Tacitus 
as a source and sheds light on the part of Roman society Tacitus was part of. 
 The reason why Tacitus is being used here as the point of comparison for the 
other literary sources is, as noted, the level of detail of his work and the fact that his 
characterizations are the most complex of all the authors to be dealt with since he, as 
much as possible, tried to give a complete historical evaluation of the events he 
covered.91 Again, this is not to say that Tacitus is the ‘most accurate’ or, if one could 
prove such an assertion, that the characterizations of the other authors are invalid or do 
not provide us with useful information. Just because one’s judgment is balanced and 
based on factual information doesn’t mean that it is right; it is still a subjective judgment. 
Indeed, despite giving balanced portrayals of these characters, Tacitus made clear to his 
readers what he thought and what his biases were. Nor was he above using his 
considerable writing talent to color his descriptions of people or to give insight into 
events, one way or another.92 Nevertheless, the fact that Tacitus gave by far the most 
detail about the people and events of 69 and the fact that his characterizations are multi-
faceted makes him well-suited to the task of being the base-line of comparison. 
 Before we look at Tacitus’ viewpoint on people and events, we should consider 
the historian himself and the sources he used. Unfortunately, virtually all we know about 
Tacitus comes from his writing. We do not even know whether his praenomen was Gaius 
or Publius. Born around 56 or 57 in what is now Northern Italy or Southern France, he 
was part of the rising group of provincial aristocrats discussed in the previous chapter. He 
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pursued a typical senatorial career, held the suffect consulship in 97, possibly 
participating in the decision by Nerva to adopt Trajan as his successor. It culminated in 
his governorship of the province of Asia in or around 112-113. There are several periods 
for which we have no firm information of his actions, and the evidence is inconclusive as 
to whether he ever served with a Legion. Counted among the great orators of his 
generation, he began writing history with a short work in praise of his father-in-law Julius 
Agricola. That Tacitus was able to marry the daughter of a significant figure such as 
Agricola hints of a noteworthy status for Tacitus, possibly because of his oratory. His 
upbringing, career, and his having lived through the final bloody years of Domitian’s 
reign, all contributed to Tacitus’ cynicism and nostalgia for the Republic. This is not to 
say that Tacitus was a Republican, he recognized the drawbacks of the Republican form 
of government and acknowledged the benefits of the Principate. What Tacitus wrestled 
with is what he saw as the corrupting affect of the Principate on Roman politics and the 
problems that arose if an unfit man was emperor.93 It is likely for this reason that Tacitus 
devoted three whole books of his Histories to 69, the year that saw three unfit men as 
emperor and a devastating civil war. This also explains the focus of Tacitus’ 
characterizations of these emperors on the question of whether or not they were capax 
imperii, or ‘worthy of empire.’ 
Tacitus provided as little information about his sources as he did about himself.94 
He admitted getting details of the Flavian campaign in Book III from Vipstanus Messalla, 
a legionary legate who participated in the campaign, but the sources for the rest of the 
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Histories are unknown.95 Given that Tacitus was alive when the civil war of 69 took 
place, it is likely he acquired some information first or second hand at the time.96 
However, it is unknown whether Tacitus was in Rome.97 No doubt he asked the players 
of that drama who survived, such as Verginius Rufus, whom Tacitus eulogized, for 
information.98 This supposition is corroborated by a remark in one of Pliny the Younger’s 
letters to Tacitus: “Petis ut tibi avunculi mei exitum scribam, quo verius tradere posteris 
possis. Gratias ago; nam video morti eius si celebretur a te immortalem gloriam esse 
propositam.”99 Pliny indicated that Tacitus was soliciting information from people, petis 
ut. . .scribam ‘you desire that I write,’ who were eye-witnesses to important events for his 
Histories.100 he also indicated that Tacitus ambition for his work was well known, and 
that there was value placed upon writing an enduring history saying that morti eius si 
celebretur a te immortalem gloriam esse propositam ‘immortal glory would be displayed 
if his (Pliny the Elder’s) death was celebrated by you’.101 As a senator, Tacitus also had 
access to the Acta Senatus, the official senate records of that body; It is unknown whether 
the Acta contained full debates or merely resolutions, although Tacitus does provide great 
detail of Senate meetings. However, just because Tacitus consulted eye-witnesses and did 
archival research, he did not necessarily present the information ‘accurately’, if it had 
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even been relayed ‘accurately’ in the first place.102 Also worth noting is the fact that 
Tacitus was also a renowned orator, possibly THE renowned orator, of his generation, a 
fact which can be seen most clearly in the speeches, based in part at least upon actual 
orations, which he puts into the mouths of his characters.103 
 Now that the background of Tacitus has been discussed we can proceed to how 
Tacitus constructed character in the Histories. Like many ancient historians, Tacitus 
began his Histories by explaining both why he was writing and how he planned to 
distinguish himself from his predecessors:104 “simul veritas pluribus modis infracta, 
primum inscitia rei publicae ut alienae, mox libidine adsentandi aut rursus odio adversus 
dominantis: ita neutris cura posteritatis inter infensos vel obnoxios.”105 Several things can 
be established here. The first is that Tacitus felt that many of his predecessors had done 
an insufficient job in recording events, either because they were ‘ignorant of state or 
foreign affairs,’ inscitia rei publicae ut alienate, or were either excessively hostile, 
infensos, or too pandering, obnoxios. 106 The second is that his lifetime of political 
experience suited him for the job.107 Tacitus, then, revealed: “mihi Galba Otho Vitellius 
nec beneficio nec iniuria cogniti. Dignitatem nostram a Vespasiano inchoatam, a Tito 
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auctam, a Domitiano longius provectam non abnuerim”.108 Thus Tacitus had no reason to 
either criticize or flatter the first three emperors with which he dealt since he ‘knew 
neither benefit nor injury,’ nec beneficio nec iniuria cogniti, from them. By revealing that 
he owed his career to the Flavians at the beginning, dignitatem nostram a Vespasiano 
inchoatam, Tacitus could not be accused of hiding his association with them. As for the 
forms of bias which do not involve personal interaction; such objectivity was not 
expected of a Roman historian and in fact it was the purpose of history to highlight 
specific moral lessons.109 This introduction, specifically Tacitus’ use of the topos of the 
impartial historian who spoke with ‘genuine honesty speaking without love or hate,’ 
incorruptam fidem professis neque amore quisquam et sine odio dicendus est, also 
declared Tacitus’ superiority over the authors who wrote before him, and highlight 
concerns which Tacitus wrestled with while writing.110 
 Tacitus demonstrated his characterization most clearly in the obituaries he 
provided for important people at their death which gave a final, definite judgment on 
their character.111 Studying these obituaries is, therefore, the best way to look at how he 
constructed character.112 The first ‘character’ heavily dealt with in the Histories is that of 
Galba, the first emperor of 69. Tacitus summed up the character of this aged emperor 
with one of his most famous pieces of writing:  
hunc exitum habuit Servius Galba, tribus et septuaginta annis quinque principes 
prospera fortuna emensus et alieno imperio felicior quam suo. vetus in familia 
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nobilitas, magnae opes: ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia quam cum 
virtutibus. famae nec incuriosus nec venditator; pecuniae alienae non adpetens, 
suae parcus, publicae avarus; amicorum libertorumque, ubi in bonos incidisset, 
sine reprehensione patiens, si mali forent, usque ad culpam ignarus. sed claritas 
natalium et metus temporum obtentui, ut, quod segnitia erat, sapientia vocaretur. 
dum vigebat aetas militari laude apud Germanias floruit. pro consule Africam 
moderate, iam senior citeriorem Hispaniam pari iustitia continuit, maior privato 
visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset.113 
 
Here is the sum of Tacitus’ characterization of Galba, he was a respectable man whose 
abilities were ‘disguised by the distinction of his origins and the fear of the times so that 
his sloth was called wisdom,’ sed claritas natalium et metus temporum obtentui, ut, quod 
segnitia erat, sapientia vocaretur.114 It was Galba’s misfortune that he came to the throne 
because he was not ‘fit for ruling,’ capax imperii.115 Tacitus commented here on the irony 
that the traits which had recommended Galba as a replacement for the debauched Nero 
were what also destroyed him, omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset. Nero had 
accustomed Rome to a generous emperor, and Galba’s strict character was as unwelcome 
in reality as it was ideal on paper. Namely, he was a good senator but was not a good 
emperor and in part this obituary is a lament that it took him ruling to discover that.116 
Tacitus did not hide Galba’s indulgence of his greedy advisors, his foolish decisions, or 
his occasional brutality, but the portrayal is, in the end, that of a man whose fate at the 
hands of the mob was undeserved.117  
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This sympathetic portrayal of Galba is further supported by the fact that Tacitus 
depicted Galba’s end as a noble one.118 Although Tacitus acknowledged that there were 
some who said that Galba had died ‘begging for a few day to pay the donative,’ paucos 
dies exolvendo donativo deprecatum, he emphasized, by saying that plures, ‘more’ 
supported it and mentioning it second, the account that Galba ‘offered his neck to the 
attackers for the good of the commonwealth,’ ultro percussoribus iugulum: agerent ac 
ferirent, si ita <e> re publica videretur.119 This shows that Tacitus thought well of Galba, 
even if he did not think him suited to the Principate. It was a common topos that dying 
well signaled a good character, although that would not make him a good emperor.120 
Worth discussing here is the often cited idea that Tacitus portrayed Galba well 
because of the parallel between Galba’s adoption of Piso and Nerva’s adoption of 
Trajan.121 This parallel is drawn from the speech Galba made to Piso at his adoption:  
'Si immensum imperii corpus stare ac librari sine rectore posset, dignus eram a 
quo res publica inciperet: nunc eo necessitatis iam pridem ventum est ut nec mea 
senectus conferre plus populo Romano possit quam bonum successorem, nec tua 
plus iuventa quam bonum principem . . . et audita adoptione desinam videri senex, 
quod nunc mihi unum obicitur’.122 
  
At first read this speech casts a poor light upon Galba, who has failed to understand the 
objection to his rule, which Galba thought was age, videri senex, quod nunc mihi unum 
obicitur, although age was not in itself a bad trait, nor chosing a man for adoption with 
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the same character traits as himself.123 At second look the speech also casts a positive 
light upon the idea of adoption of the best senator as a method for choosing a successor 
by saying that ‘my age can confer nothing better to the Roman people than a good 
successor,’ mea senectus conferre plus populo Romano posit quam bonum 
successorem.
124
 The idea that Galba did care for the good of the Republic may have come 
from coins which Galba minted baring such legends as Libertas and Salus. Therefore, 
although Galba’s choice of Piso was poor, the principle was sound, and by implication 
Nerva was wise both in choosing to adopt a successor and in his choice of Trajan.125 It is 
possible, then, that Tacitus portrayed Galba as a noble, if flawed and tragic, character out 
of deference to Nerva. If Tacitus did so here, where else did he alter his characterization 
to suit some personal or political end?126 
While Tacitus was sympathetic to Galba, either because of his respect for Nerva 
or because Galba’s own ideals match his own to some degree, the very career of Otho, 
who usurped Galba, was a puzzle. Throughout the Histories, Tacitus used Otho to 
illuminate the divide between action and people’s view of those actions.127 Thus, when 
Tacitus credited Otho for doing something beneficial, he would then detract from it by 
saying that it was ‘advantageous,’ utilem, in order not to alienate supporters, ne vulgi 
largitione centurionum animos averteret.128 And when Tacitus conveyed that ‘against the 
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hope of all,’ contra spem omnium, that Otho was not living down to the reputation earned 
by his association with Nero and was actually ‘arranging everything to the honor of 
ruling,’ cuncta ad decorem imperii composite, he implied that it was all just a façade of 
‘false virtue and vices sure to return,’ falsae virtutes et vitia reditura.129 Tacitus drew a 
line between Otho’s actions and his intentions.130 Tacitus clearly thought that many of the 
actions Otho took as emperor were good, but in his characterization he wrestled with 
Otho’s past actions, namely having for a time lived a more drunken and debauched 
lifestyle than even Nero.131 As a result of both Otho’s actions in his early life and the 
bloody coup which made him Princeps Tacitus was extremely grudging in his 
compliments to Otho.132 The reason being that Otho’s abhorrent way, to Tacitus, of 
coming to power served undermined his legitimacy, despite his performance as Princeps. 
Tacitus’ attitude towards Otho lightened when it came to Otho’s death, by suicide, 
and Tacitus was forced to deal with what is and was the great question of Otho’s life: 
why did he commit suicide after losing only one battle and with ample forces still at his 
disposal? Tacitus dedicated his considerable oratorical skill to answering the question, 
having Otho address his attendants thus after his army’s defeat at Bedriacum:  
‘experti in vicem sumus ego ac fortuna. nec tempus conputaveritis: difficilius est 
temperare felicitati qua te non putes diu usurum. civile bellum a Vitellio coepit, et 
ut de principatu certaremus armis initium illic fuit: ne plus quam semel certemus 
penes me exemplum erit . . . plura de extremis loqui pars ignaviae est. praecipuum 
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destinationis meae documentum habete quod de nemine queror; nam incusare 
deos vel homines eius est qui vivere velit.’133 
 
Thus Tacitus showed Otho meeting his end not from despair or fear but with the sober 
realization that fortune was ‘not with him,’ non. . . diu usurum” and with the desire not to 
put Rome through the distress of a prolonged civil war  that ‘the example of not 
contending more than once would be his,’ ne plus quam semel certemus penes me 
exemplum erit. The speech is certainly Tacitus’, but the presence of eye-witnesses makes 
it possible that the content of the speech was indeed accurate. In the end, Tacitus 
summarized Otho’s life and career with the line: “duobus facinoribus, altero 
flagitiosissimo, altero egregio, tantundem apud posteros meruit bonae famae quantum 
malae.”134 That Tacitus despised the ‘most disgraceful act,’ facinoribus . . . altero 
flagitiosissimo, that brought him to power is clear, and was the reason for his criticism, 
but paradoxically he also admired him for the ‘exceptional,’ altero egregio, way he ended 
his life.135 It is this paradox which Tacitus used to characterize Otho and perhaps why he 
does not give a clear judgment on whether or not Otho was capax imperii.136 
 While Tacitus’ characterization of Otho was rife with paradox, his 
characterization of Vitellius, the third emperor of 69, was rife with criticism. The charges 
Tacitus most frequently laid against Vitellius were that ‘Vitellius honored Nero with 
admiration,’ Neronem ipsum Vitellius admiratione celebrabat, and that he was a 
‘surrendered himself to luxury and gluttony,’ luxu et saginae mancipatus emptusque.137 
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From the very first mention, Tacitus rarely bothered to hide his disdain for Vitellius.138 
For Tacitus, Vitellius was the opposite of what an emperor should be.139 Tacitus covered 
up Vitellius’ positive traits even more than he did Otho’s, as demonstrated by the 
following account of Vitellius first days in Rome:  
Postera die tamquam apud alterius civitatis senatum populumque magnificam 
orationem de semet ipso prompsit, industriam temperantiamque suam laudibus 
attollens, consciis flagitiorum ipsis qui aderant omnique Italia, per quam somno et 
luxu pudendus incesserat. vulgus tamen vacuum curis et sine falsi verique 
discrimine solitas adulationes edoctum clamore et vocibus adstrepebat; 
abnuentique nomen Augusti expressere ut adsumeret, tam frustra quam 
recusaverat.140 
  
For Tacitus, the worse thing an emperor could do was allow himself to be ‘forced,’ 
expressere, to do something, as here ‘to take up the name of Augustus,’ nomen Augusti . . 
. ut adsumeret, since the whole purpose of the Principate was to protect and stabilize the 
Roman world.141 While Tacitus at least grudgingly admitted Otho’s positive actions, this 
depiction of Vitellius ignored three things.142 The first is that Vitellius was actually 
addressing the senate, which he often did, something his predecessors did only rarely.143 
The second is that he killed only those he absolutely had to, so he could certainly be said 
to have at least some ‘self-control,’ temperantiam, something also mirrored on Vitellius’ 
Clementia coins.144 Finally, there was his initial ‘refusal,’ recusaverat, of the title of 
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‘Augustus’ which was a common political tool since the days of Augustus, if not 
before.145 It is here that one can see Tacitus playing with this common topos in that he 
describes both the recusatio and the acceptance as ‘purposeless,’ frustra. 
 As in Otho’s case, Tacitus gave Vitellius a small measure of sympathy at his end, 
dying at the hand of Flavian soldiers:  
principatum ei detulere qui ipsum non noverant: studia exercitus raro cuiquam 
bonis artibus quaesita perinde adfuere quam huic per ignaviam. inerat tamen 
simplicitas ac liberalitas, quae, ni adsit modus, in exitium vertuntur. amicitias 
dum magnitudine munerum, non constantia morum contineri putat, meruit magis 
quam habuit. rei publicae haud dubie intererat Vitellium vinci.146 
 
Tacitus’ obituary of Vitellius gave him credit for having ‘candor and generosity,’ 
simplicitas ac liberalitas. But, in order to highlight his own opinion, he used those virtues 
to underline the weakness of his character, namely that since ‘they were not moderated, 
they caused his end,’ quae, ni adsit modus, in exitium vertuntur.147 Vitellius was not 
wholly a bad man, but his weak character was bad for Rome, and therefore it was ‘for the 
good of the Republic that he be overthrown,’ rei publicae haud dubie intererat Vitellium 
vinci.148 Vitellius’ gluttony not only was detrimental to himself but corrupted Roman 
politics as a whole since the ‘only way to power was to satisfy Vitellius’ insatiable 
desires,’ unum ad potentiam iter. . .satiare inexplebilis Vitellii libidines.149 In addition, 
Tacitus criticized Vitellius for being so weak that he could not even spare Rome from 
                                                                                                                                                 
144
 Greenhalgh, The Year of the Four Emperors, 121. Tacitus does admit this, grudgingly 
 
145
 John Crook, “The Roman Principate,” review of Recherches sur l’aspect ideologique du 
principat, by Jean Beranger. The Classical Review 5 (1955): 79-81. 
 
146
 Tacitus, Histories, III.86. 
 
147
 Syme, Tacitus vol. I, 190. 
 
148
 Ash, Ordering Anarchy, 110-113. 
 
149
 Tacitus, Histories, II.95. 
 40
bloodshed, lamenting that ‘if only Vitellius could have persuade the minds of other as 
easily has his own yielded, Vespasian’s army would have entered the city bloodlessly’ 
quod si tam facile suorum mentis flexisset Vitellius, quam ipse cesserat, incruentam 
urbem Vespasiani exercitus intrasset.150 In the end, Tacitus’ biggest problem with 
Vitellius was that he could not control his own supporters, because they indulged his 
appetites and he was too malleable to their opinions.151 To Tacitus, Vitellius was not 
capax imperii as his presence in Rome was both corrupting and deprived the Roman 
people of security and strong leadership.152 
 The final emperor of 69 to be dealt with is Vespasian, the victor of the civil war. 
Unfortunately, we are missing the portion of the Histories in which Tacitus dealt with the 
reign and death of Vespasian. We are thus missing Tacitus’ obituary and final opinion on 
Vespasian leaving his characterization incomplete. What we are left with is the 
tantalizing comment that Vespasian ‘alone among his predecessors became better while 
Emperor,’ solusque omnium ante se principum in melius mutatus est.153 Given Tacitus’ 
famous pessimism, it is impossible to determine just how positive Tacitus was towards 
Vespasian. What he wrote in the surviving portion of the Histories does not offer a clear 
opinion.154 Instead, what Tacitus focused on in these books is the question of why and 
how Vespasian pursued the Principate. 
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Interestingly, in these three books Tacitus gave greater characterization to 
Vespasian’s subordinates, Mucianus and especially Antonius Primus. It is they who were 
assigned the active role in winning the civil war for Vespasian. The following is part of 
speech Tacitus has Mucianus make to Vespasian to persuade him to become emperor: 
ego te, Vespasiane, ad imperium voco, quam salutare rei publicae, quam tibi 
magnificum, iuxta deos in tua manu positum est. nec speciem adulantis expaveris: 
a contumelia quam a laude propius fuerit post Vitellium eligi. non adversus divi 
Augusti acerrimam mentem nec adversus cautissimam Tiberii senectutem, ne 
contra Gai quidem aut Claudii vel Neronis fundatam longo imperio domum 
exurgimus; cessisti etiam Galbae imaginibus: torpere ultra et polluendam 
perdendamque rem publicam relinquere sopor et ignavia videretur, etiam si tibi 
quam inhonesta, tam tuta servitus esset.155 
  
Vespasian is depicted as a passive figure here, needing to be persuaded to seize his 
chance to become emperor, Mucianus literally says ‘I call you to rule, Vespasian,’ ego te, 
Vespasiane, ad imperium voco.156 While verbally it follows some of the forms of a 
recusatio, this is a private meeting which defeats the purpose of the gesture, although 
Tacitus may well be playing with the idea here that this was Vespasian’s real recusatio 
rather than his later acclamation by his soldiers.157 The absence of Vespasian’s virtues 
here implied that Vespasian’s claim on the throne was not proper as much as it was 
superior to Vitellius,’ who, according to Mucianus, ‘it would be more an insult than 
praise to chosen after,’ a contumelia quam a laude propius fuerit post Vitellium eligi.158 
That a ‘new man’ like Vespasian was now worthy of the Principate was no more 
complimentary to Vespasian than it was to the Principate itself.159 As noted, Vespasian 
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was not even the deciding factor in his faction’s victory, Antonius Primus won the 
campaign against Vitellius, despite acting in ways that ‘Vespasian was ignorant of or had 
forbidden,’ quae ignara Vespasiano aut vetita.160 Tacitus was perhaps playing with the 
idea that Vespasian remained clear of the fighting so that he could appear to have clean 
hands as a way of gaining legitimacy, which was likely how the Flavians presented it and 
Tacitus followed it at the expense of making Vespasian seem week.161 On the surface this 
is not a complimentary portrayal, and it is, again, unfortunate that we do not have 
Tacitus’ complete depiction of Vespasian. 
 Throughout the Histories, Tacitus gave just as much characterization, and often 
more of the blame for the events, to the various subordinates of the emperors.162 It is 
worth considering such passages as this, since Tacitus gave them far more attention than 
the other authors do: “multi in utroque exercitu sicut modesti quietique ita mali et strenui. 
sed profusa cupidine et insigni temeritate legati legionum Alienus Caecina et Fabius 
Valens.”163 The two men named were the ones who ‘induced Vitellius,’ instigare 
Vitellium to proclaim himself emperor. As with all the other subordinates with whom he 
dealt, Tacitus focused his characterization on Caecina and Valens’ ‘great,’ profuse and 
ultimately detrimental ‘greed,’ cupidine since a Roman general was meant to protect the 
republic, not seek personal gain.164 Even here, however, Tacitus gave some indication of 
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the virtues which these men possessed such as ‘notable bravery,’ insigni temeritate. As 
with Otho, Tacitus spent much time wrestling with the paradoxical conflict between their 
greedy and violent motives and actions and their more positive attributes.165 Caecina and 
Valens here, and Antonius Primus in the Flavian faction, are the men whom Tacitus often 
blamed for the disasters of 69. It is on Antonius Primus, for example, that Tacitus laid the 
crime of the sack of Cremona by saying “Antonius did not sink to this terrible crime from 
his reputation and lifestyle,’ quod neque Antonius . . . a fama vitaque sua quamvis 
pessimo flagitio degeneravere, meaning that it was in keeping with his previous 
lifestyle.166 Not only did Primus fail to rein in his soldiers’ passions as a good general 
should, he is even depicted as encouraging them to indulge those passions and sack the 
city.167 Tacitus did not wholly absolve the soldiers from their bloodlust during the actual 
sack, but he places responsibility for the incident squarely on the shoulders of their 
commanders.168 Nevertheless, despite laying the crime of the sacking of Cremona at 
Primus’ feet, Tacitus still acknowledged his usefulness in the chaotic times of civil war, 
saying famously that he was ‘the worst in peace, but not to be scorned in war,’ pace 
pessimus, bello non spernendus.169 
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 Tacitus made the following statement, a rare case of him directly citing and 
challenging a previous historical characterization, to condemn Alienus Caecina, who 
supported and then betrayed Vitellius.170 
Scriptores temporum, qui potiente rerum Flavia domo monimenta belli huiusce 
composuerunt, curam pacis et amorem rei publicae, corruptas in adulationem 
causas, tradidere: nobis super insitam levitatem et prodito Galba vilem mox fidem 
aemulatione etiam invidiaque, ne ab aliis apud Vitellium anteirentur, pervertisse 
ipsum Vitellium videntur. Caecina legiones adsecutus centurionum militumque 
animos obstinatos pro Vitellio variis artibus subruebat.171 
 
Tacitus certainly did not think well of such men if the only motive he gave them for their 
‘betrayal of Vitellius,’ pervertisse ipsum Vitellium was that they ‘did not want anyone 
else to gain more favor with him,’ ne ab aliis apud Vitellium anteirentur. It is quite clear 
Tacitus thought that such men as this were one of the core problems Rome suffered 
during the civil war: “magna et misera civitas, eodem anno Othonem Vitellium passa, 
inter Vinios Fabios Icelos Asiaticos varia et pudenda sorte agebat, donec successere 
Mucianus et Marcellus et magis alii homines quam alii mores.”172 It is these men, a 
‘changeable and scandalous sort,’ varia et pudenda sorte agebat, that Tacitus viewed as 
the real problem for the Roman government and people in 69. Even Mucianus and 
Marcellus, supporters of Vespasian, are painted with the same brush, with the line that 
they were ‘more different men than different morality,’ magis alii hominess quam alii 
mores. All of them, Tacitus implies caused civil strife in order to satisfy their own 
appetites for power. 
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Tacitus characterized groups of people as well as individuals, the mob of Rome, 
for example, as well as the Senate and the soldiery. The army will be dealt with in the 
chapters on Josephus and Plutarch, each of whom characterized the Roman army 
differently. The mob of Rome, however, provides an interesting counterpoint to the four 
emperors discussed so far. The reason being that Tacitus, in passages such as the 
following portrayed the ‘mob’ of Rome in a wholly negative light:173 
Vniversa iam plebs Palatium implebat, mixtis servitiis et dissono clamore caedem 
Othonis et coniuratorum exitium poscentium ut si in circo aut theatro ludicrum 
aliquod postularent: neque illis iudicium aut veritas, quippe eodem die diversa 
pari certamine postulaturis, sed tradito more quemcumque principem adulandi 
licentia adclamationum et studiis inanibus.174 
 
Tacitus’ disdain for the mob of Rome is obvious: he viewed it as little more than sheep 
wishing to be fed and entertained ‘as if in the circus or theater,’ ut si in circo aut 
theatro.175 This is the point of view of the Senator who felt that political matters should 
be treated with decorum and propriety rather than ‘reckless applause and meaningless 
zeal,’ licentia adclamationum et studiis inanibus.176 Here Tacitus was not trying to be 
nuanced or sympathetic. If he were, he might have observed that by this time the urban 
populace was wholly disenfranchised and dependent on the Emperor for its own well-
being.177 It cheered the emperor for it could do little else. To do otherwise would have 
invited reprisal against which it could not defend itself.178 
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 Tacitus characterized the Senate, much like the fickle mob, as being a passive in 
the face of the emperor, but unlike the mob he acknowledged in passages such as this that 
they were in a difficult position: 
 coacto vero in curiam senatu arduus rerum omnium modus, ne contumax 
silentium, ne suspecta libertas; et privato Othoni nuper atque eadem dicenti nota 
adulatio. igitur versare sententias et huc atque illuc torquere, hostem et parricidam 
Vitellium vocantes, providen- tissimus quisque vulgaribus conviciis, quidam vera 
probra iacere, in clamore tamen et ubi plurimae voces, aut tumultu verborum sibi 
ipsi obstrepentes.179 
 
Tacitus’ depiction of the senate here is certainly not positive. He depicted them as only 
willing to ‘throw out reproaches founded in truth,’ vera probra iacere, which sounds 
positive, but when added to the fact that they were only willing to do so when ‘many 
others were speaking,’ in clamore tamen et ubi plurimae voces so as to disguise their 
voices is quite damning. For a man such as Tacitus, who firmly believed that the Senate 
should be a part of the Roman government, even under the Principate, such 
submissiveness was quite galling.180 However, Tacitus did acknowledge that the senate 
was caught in a difficult position during a civil war since condemning one side or the 
other could be found suspicious, ne contumax silentium, ne suspecta libertas, which 
paints them better than the plebs, although both were in the same situation. Tacitus’ 
depiction of the Senate also shows examples of the Senate attempting, whenever they 
could, to establish their proper role in the Roman government. Saying “adcurrunt patres: 
decernitur Othoni tribunicia potestas et nomen Augusti et omnes principum honores” 
shows the senate hastening, adcurrunt patres, to ‘grant Otho the honors of the 
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Principate,’ decernitur. . .omnes principum honores, which he had already de facto 
seized.181 This indicates that the Senate was anxious to secure its role in the political 
process, namely as the body that granted imperial power to a new emperor, much as the 
Senate would do at the end of that year with the lex de imperio Vespasiani.182 
 Having studied Tacitus’ characterization of people, I will turn to how he treated 
the civil war as a whole. He examined, in great detail, the various people and forces 
which contributed to the conflict and, moreover, assigned many a share of the blame for 
individual incidents. Only at the end of Book III, however, did Tacitus turn to a depiction 
of the war as a whole. 
Id facinus post conditam urbem luctuosissimum foedissimumque rei publicae 
populi Romani accidit, nullo externo hoste, propitiis, si per mores nostros liceret, 
deis, sedem Iovis Optimi Maximi auspicato a maioribus pignus imperii conditam, 
quam non Porsenna dedita urbe neque Galli capta temerare potuissent, furore 
principum excindi. arserat et ante Capitolium civili bello, sed fraude privata: nunc 
palam obsessum, palam incensum.183 
 
This was for Tacitus the great tragedy of civil war.184 The symbol of Roman sovereignty 
and power was burned to the ground by Roman hands, not those of a foreign invader, ‘not 
even the capturing Gauls were able to violate it,’ neque Galli capta temerare 
potuissent.185 Desire for imperial power was so great that the very symbol of that power 
was was ‘destroyed by the fury of the emperors,’ furore principum excindi. This was a 
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symbolic destruction of Roman authority, already lost, temporarily, in the fight over the 
Principate and Tacitus gave all 4 emperors a share in the blame for it.186  
It was not the emperors themselves who were, for Tacitus, the real problem, it 
was the Principate itself. As has already been noted, Tacitus was not a Republican or 
against the Principate in general.187 Tacitus acknowledged that having one person in 
charge was necessary for peace and stability. However, as Tacitus repeated in his works, 
there were drawbacks inherent to the system, the chief of which was its corrupting 
influence on people in power and the resultant difficulty in finding someone who was 
capax imperii, which as has been noted, was one of Tacitus’ primary preoccupations in 
constructing the characters of the emperors of 69.188 As Tacitus noted in his introduction, 
it was the Principate itself which prevented unbiased histories from being written which 
Tacitus was perhaps trying to remedy with this account in which he explored these 
problems and illustrated various lessons about the Principate.189 This was the cause for 
Tacitus of the civil war because, without this seat of power to strive for, the civil war 
either would not have happened or, if it did, it would not have been as detrimental to 
Rome.190  
The actions of the Emperors’ subordinates was also traced back to the corrupting 
influence of the Principate by Tacitus, since without the benefits of the Principate which 
they could coax from the Emperor those subordinate would not have been so adamant in 
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the pursuit of the war. Tacitus noted that “aut legatos ac duces magna ex parte luxus 
egestatis scelerum sibi conscios nisi pollutum obstrictumque meritis suis principem 
passuros.”191 These commanders and administrators supported their candidates for 
Empire not because they thought that they were the right choice, but because they hoped 
that the favor of the new emperor would be ‘gained for themselves,’ meritis suis.192 Thus 
the root and cause of all the horrors of Civil War was the existence of the Principate. 
As can be seen by the above analyses, while Tacitus was certainly opinionated, he 
also at least to endeavored to present balanced characterizations of the people involved 
and of the causes of specific events of the war. There were certainly limits to what 
Tacitus understood, or perhaps wished to understand and the degree to which he met his 
own ideals, let alone ours, of an unbiased history is a matter of debate. However, it is 
evident that he did make an effort to be balanced. Tacitus’ high level of detail in relating 
events and the nuance with which he made his characterizations make him the ‘control’ 
for this look at various accounts of 69. As demonstrated in this chapter, Tacitus’ own 
viewpoint was cynical, critical, and provides the reader with a complex depiction of civil 
war, albeit with a senatorial bias. In particular, Tacitus’ focus on whether these emperors 
were capax imperii gives the modern reader a view on this civil war which questions 
whether any of these men were worthy of being emperor. It also provides a coherent 
questioning of the role and effects of the Principate as an institution. Even at the time 
when Tacitus was writing, 130 years after its creation, there were likely still many asking 
this question. Therefore this account also reflects back on the people who, like Tacitus, 
viewed the Principate in a critical light, most likely other Roman senators. 
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CHAPTER IV 
JOSEPHUS 
 
 The Jewish Historian Yosef ben Mattithyahu (37-100), usually called Flavius 
Josephus, is the earliest author, whose work survives, to treat the Roman civil war of 
69.193 He lived through and participated in the events of that year and recorded them less 
than a decade later as part of his Bellum Iudaicum.194 Because of this, one might think 
him the most accurate source, even though the Roman civil war was not the focus of his 
work. However, Josephus wrote all of his works under the patronage of the Flavian 
emperors, and may have written this under their direction as well; although that does not 
mean that it was not his choice.195 
 The possibility that Josephus’ characterization of the people and events of the 
civil war contains what is often, unfairly and inaccurately, called ‘Flavian propaganda’ 
makes dealing with the Bellum Iudaicum a challenge. In fact, Tacitus may have had 
Josephus in mind while making the following criticism of previous historians that they 
were “mox libidine adsentandi aut rursus odio adversus dominantis: ita neutris cura 
posteritatis inter infensos vel obnoxios.”196 While it is an exaggeration to say that 
Josephus had ‘no regard for posterity,’ ita neutris cura posteritatis, since he initially 
wrote the Bellum Iudaicum to explain the Jewish War to the Jewish people living to the 
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east of the empire, he certainly did paint a rosy picture of Vespasian.197 Therefore, 
Josephus will be studied for his insights into the people and events of the civil war of 69. 
This narrative will be compared to that of Tacitus in order for us to get at least some idea 
of what the Flavian ‘approved’ version of the civil war may, perhaps, have looked like. 
 It should be kept in mind while studying the Bellum Iudaicum that the Roman 
civil war was not its focus. Josephus’ concern was the war of the Jewish people against 
the Romans. With this focus, Josephus treats the Roman civil war as a background event 
which affected the Jewish War only indirectly. When he does discuss the civil war, his 
primary concern is the elevation of Vespasian from general of the Romans army in 
Judaea to emperor.198 This is underlined by a passage from Josephus’ prologue: “Now at 
the time when this great concussion of affairs happened, the affairs of the Romans were 
themselves in great disorder.”199 Aside from a later mention of the succession of 
emperors ending with Vespasian, this is the only detail Josephus gave in his opening 
concerning the Roman civil war. This indicates that Josephus considered it less 
momentous than the Jewish War, at least within the context of Josephus purpose of 
explaining the Jewish War.200 
 Before discussing in detail Josephus’ characterization we must first take a look at 
the sources he used. Much of the Bellum Iudaicum is based on Josephus’ own 
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recollection of events.201 He not only lived through but also participated in many of the 
events he described.202 Among other things, Josephus was a general, a prisoner of 
Vespasian, and a witness to Titus’ conquest of Jerusalem.203 For the Roman civil war, 
Josephus’ information likely came at least partially from his association with Vespasian 
and members of his party.204 Indeed he claimed that he had read and made use of 
Vespasian’s own Comentarii, now lost, on the war.205 Josephus also lived in Rome 
starting in 71 and, therefore, had easy access to the many eyewitnesses. Since Josephus 
provided only occasional information on Rome, it is unclear how much use he made of 
such a wealth of information. It is also possible that Josephus only recorded the Flavian 
‘party line’ on events which were, at best, a secondary focus for him.206 
 The first time that Josephus met Vespasian in the Bellum Iudaicum sets the stage 
for Vespasian’s rise and the tone for Josephus’ treatment of him. Josephus had just been 
defeated by Vespasian and, deciding not to commit suicide as his compatriots had, he 
allowed himself to be captured and made the follow prophecy to Vespasian: 
You, O Vespasian, think no more than that you have taken Josephus himself 
captive; but I come to you as a messenger of greater tidings; for had not I been 
sent by God to you, I knew what was the law of the Jews in this case and how it 
becomes generals to die. Do you send me to Nero? For Why? Are Nero’s 
successors until they come to you still alive? You, O Vespasian, are Caesar and 
emperor, you, and this your son.207 
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At first glance Josephus was both justifying why he did not commit suicide rather than 
being captured, saying that he was sent by God to deliver a message, and making an 
argument for why Vespasian should not have him killed, since as an oracle predicting 
great things for Vespasian he should be kept alive.208 What is interesting, however, is 
Josephus’ claim that he made this prediction to Vespasian two years before the civil war 
had actually begun, perhaps as a way of establishing his own importance to his readers.209 
Still more interesting is the divine sanction put behind it.210 There is no way of knowing 
whether Josephus fabricated this at the time of writing, although Vespasian clearly did 
spare his life.211 It is possible that Josephus made such a claim to save his life and mere 
chance proved it true. That would explain why Vespasian both freed and honored 
Josephus. Whatever the truth, this gives the impression that Vespasian was destined to 
rule by the Jewish God; a strong, if dangerous, endorsement even for a Roman.212 
 In comparison, Tacitus also made reference to the omens which presaged 
Vespasian’s rise. However, Tacitus indicated his own opinion on oracle in the following 
passage: “occulta fati et ostentis ac responsis destinatum Vespasiano liberisque eius 
imperium post fortunam credidimus.”213 That Tacitus viewed oracles as something only 
‘believed after the fact,’ post fortunam credidimus, shows that he thought them neither 
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reliable nor something on which to base decisions.214 In Roman society, oracles were 
consulted both regularly and before important tasks were undertaken, therefore, as 
Tacitus recognized, it was important to have the right attitude toward Oracles and having 
good omens on one’s side was a great boost to legitimacy.215 However, Tacitus expressed 
doubt concerning oracles himself, as already noted, and seemed to have a low opinion of 
those who trusted in such things. Tacitus detailed many of the oracles Vespasian 
consulted which were said to presage his rise later in the Histories. In light of Tacitus’ 
opinion, however, Vespasian’s character becomes, by implication, both indecisive and 
superstitious for his frequent consultation of oracles.216 Thus, what for Josephus was a 
means of establishing both Vespasian legitimacy and his own authority was used by 
Tacitus to highlight a character flaw which he perceived in Vespasian. 
 When the Roman Civil war does enter the narrative of the Bellum Iudaicum 
Josephus, of course, took the opportunity to give Vespasian further characterization.  
In the meantime, an account came that there was commotions in Gaul, and that 
Vindex, together with the men of power in that country, had revolted from Nero; 
which affair is more accurately described elsewhere. This report, thus related to 
Vespasian, excited him to go on briskly with the war; for he foresaw already the 
civil wars which were coming upon them, nay, that the very government was in 
danger, and he thought if he could first reduce the eastern parts of the empire to 
peace, he should make the fears for Italy the lighter.217  
 
Josephus characterized Vespasian as having foreseen the civil war and taken care to ease 
the empire’s burden by ending the Jewish War. To Josephus’ credit, he did admit earlier 
in the work that the Roman civil war was not his focus and that there were others better 
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suited to explain it.218 However, this idea runs into two problems. First, since the revolt of 
Vindex was quickly crushed, it is questionable whether anyone could have predicted the 
destructive civil war of 69, even in light of widespread discontent against Nero. Nero’s 
needless panic and suicide started the chain of events that placed Vespasian upon the 
throne. The second issue betrays Josephus’ bias for the seriousness of the Jewish War. It 
was a major rebellion, and its suppression was in Rome’s interest, but it was not a threat 
to the empire or a cause of fear in Italy.219  
 Tacitus also commented upon Vespasian’s actions in the east. He recorded, 
“Profligaverat bellum Iudaicum Vespasianus, obpugnatione Hierosolymorum reliqua, 
duro magis et arduo opere ob ingenium montis et pervicaciam superstitionis quam quo 
satis virium obsessis ad tolerandas necessitates superesset.”220 Leaving aside Tacitus’ 
bias against the Jewish people and their ‘stubborn superstition,’ pervicaciam 
superstitionis, this is still a lower opinion of the importance of the Jewish War. The war 
seems a nuisance to the Roman army, but nothing more.221 Tacitus’ implies that taking 
Jerusalem would be a simple operation, ‘difficult only because of the nature of the 
mountain,’ arduo opere ob ingenium montis. However, his readers certainly knew that 
the city did not fall until the following year. This indicates that, in Tacitus’ view, 
Vespasian did not attempt to end the war quickly. Tacitus credits Vespasian with being a 
good soldier, if perhaps too cautious, but not with having an urge to ease the burden of 
Rome. However, there is not necessarily a contradiction between these accounts. 
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Josephus was discussing the campaign season of 68 and Tacitus that of 69, and Tacitus 
does acknowledge that by the beginning of 69 ‘Vespasian had ended the Jewish war,’ 
Profligaverat bellum Iudaicum Vespasianus. Josephus’ characterization of Vespasian is 
still the more positive one, however. 
 While Josephus mentioned Galba and Otho only in passing, he gave a full 
characterization of Vitellius. Since Vespasian wrested the empire from Vitellius, such a 
characterization was necessary to justify Vespasian’s rebellion.222  
Now about this very time it was that heavy calamities came about Rome on all 
sides; for Vitellius was come from Germany with his soldiers, and drew along 
with him a great multitude of other men besides. And when the spaces allotted for 
the soldiers could not contain them, he made all Rome itself his camp, and filled 
all the houses with his armed men; which men, when they saw the riches of Rome 
with those eyes which had never seen such riches before, and found themselves 
shone around on all sides with silver and gold, they had much ado to contain their 
covetous desires, and were ready to betake themselves to plunder and to slaughter 
of such as should stand in their way. And this was the state of affairs in Italy at 
that time.223 
  
While Josephus did not characterize Vitellius directly here, Vitellius was assigned the 
blame for causing calamity in Rome by bringing such avaricious soldiers.224 Josephus 
indicated that Vitellius’ very presence in Rome had brought chaos and destruction to the 
city.225 Josephus also characterized Vitellius’ soldiers as being more of an uncouth rabble 
than an army.226 The soldiers were blamed for looting and murdering, but Vitellius was 
assigned the greater blame for having brought them in the first place.227 
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 On this matter Tacitus and Josephus were in agreement. As we have seen, Tacitus 
portrayed Vitellius as being an inherently corrupted and corrupting figure. He painted a 
similar picture of Vitellius’ soldiers, that of an almost ravening horde ‘wandering through 
the colonnades, the shrines, and the whole city,’ in porticibus aut delubris et urbe tota 
vagus.228 He also characterized Vitellius as ‘permitting anything to his generals and 
soldiers,’ Ceterum non ita ducibus indulsit Vitellius ut non plus militi liceret.229 Like 
Josephus, Tacitus blamed Vitellius for the problems his soldiers brought to Rome. He did 
not say that Vitellius caused the problems, but his presence, and that of his army, 
disrupted the city.230 While Tacitus portrayed the soldiers more positively than does 
Josephus and his depiction of Vitellius was more complex, he continually returned to the 
chaos and degradation that Vitellius brought on Rome.231 It is possible that both writers 
were influenced by the Flavian ‘party line,’ it being common for the victorious party of a 
civil war to criticize the morality of the defeated party to establish legitimacy for their 
new regime.232 However, even if these accounts are exaggerated, this does not invalidate 
their point of view. 
 Josephus used his characterization of Vitellius as the reason why Vespasian’s 
troops pushed for civil war.  
For that neither will the Roman senate, nor people, bear such a lascivious emperor 
as Vitellius, if he be compared with their chaste Vespasian; nor will they endure a 
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most barbarous tyrant, instead of a good governor, nor choose one that has no 
child to preside over them, instead of him that is a father; because the 
advancement of men’s own children to dignities is certainly the greatest security 
kings can have for themselves.233 
  
This gives an important point of characterization to Vespasian’s soldiers. Namely that 
they were concerned for the Roman state and wished to save it from Vitellius’ 
corruption.234 Also of note here is the fact that Vespasian’s sons were cited as one the 
main points in Vespasian’s favor. This stems, perhaps, from Josephus’ high regard for the 
elder son, Titus, although, as already noted with the coinage, Vespasian’s ability to offer 
a stable succession was an important part of his gaining legitimacy.235 While it is 
questionable whether all, or even some, of Vespasian’s soldiers felt this way, of greater 
concern are the factual errors. When Vespasian was declared emperor, Vitellius had not 
yet reached Rome and Vitellius also had a son, albeit one who was much younger and 
unproven.236 This characterization of the event absolves Vespasian of the crime of 
rebellion, since he was shown doing so only to save Rome at the behest of his soldiers.237 
Since such a recusatio gave greater legitimacy than mere conquest, the Flavians would 
almost certainly have endorsed this depiction of their rise.238 
 Once more, Tacitus provided a different perspective on how and why Vespasian 
was declared emperor. The following passage indicates that he did not think it 
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spontaneous: “At Vespasianus bellum armaque et procul vel iuxta sitas viris 
circumspectabat. miles ipsi adeo paratus ut praeeuntem sacramentum et fausta Vitellio 
omnia precantem per silentium audierint.”239 Tacitus agrees with Josephus that 
Vespasian’s ‘soldiers were devoted to him,’ miles ipsi adeo paratus, but posits that 
‘Vespasian was contemplating war and arms,’ At Vespasianus bellum armaque. . 
.circumspectabat, against Vitellius before he was proclaimed by his soldiers. Tacitus’ 
account is supported by the fact that Mucianus departed on his campaign to Italy almost 
immediately after the proclamation, a fact that indicates prior planning. In fairness, 
however, Josephus did not say that the acclamation was spontaneous, merely enthusiastic 
and for benevolent reasons. Thus, these two accounts are different but not mutually 
exclusive. Tacitus also characterized Titus as having ‘reputation, talent, and great 
fortune,’ famam. . .ingenium. . .quantaecumque fortunae, but was more reserved about it 
than Josephus.240 Namely he implied that Titus’ success to date was largely a result of 
‘beautiful face and a certain grandeur,’ decor oris cum quadam maiestate. 
 Josephus followed his account of Vespasian’s acclamation as emperor with the 
newly crowned emperor asking Titus Alexander, governor of Egypt, for aid.  
Justly, therefore, did Vespasian desire to obtain that government, in order to 
corroborate his attempts upon the whole empire; so he immediately sent to 
Tiberius Alexander, who was then governor of Egypt and of Alexandria, and 
informed him what the army had put upon him, and how he, being forced to 
accept of the burden of the government was desirous to have him for ally and 
supporter.241 
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Josephus continued his characterization of Vespasian by describing the Principate as 
burden to be undertaken, a common trope of rulers.242 More importantly, Vespasian was 
characterized as having the intelligence to immediately gain the support of Egypt, a 
province both wealthy and vital to Rome’s grain supply.243 Every other source, however, 
depicted Egypt as declaring for Vespasian first, with the Judaean legions following a few 
days later.244 It is widely supposed that Josephus manipulated the sequence of events so 
that it was Vespasian’s troops that declared for him first, thus raising the prestige of both. 
This is unfair to Josephus as he was an actual eye-witness and by that logic it is just as 
possible that the other writers changed the sequence of events to suit their own ends.245 
 While Tacitus openly stated that it was in the best interest of Rome to remove 
Vitellius, he did not credit Vespasian with rebelling for this reason. He also, as noted, 
gave the initiative for the rebellion to Tiberius Alexander, initium ferendi ad 
Vespasianum imperii Alexandriae coetum, and the legions stationed in Alexandria, after 
Vespasian, Mucianus, and Tiberius Alexander had already agreed to rebel.246 As already 
discussed, that Tacitus took the initiative for the rebellion away from Vespasian fits with 
his portrayal of Vespasian as a passive character needing to be prompted to action.247 
Tacitus was playing here with the idea of Vespasian being ‘prompted to the Principate’ in 
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counter to the recusatio topos which various authors, such as Josephus, invoked in order 
to legitimize Vespasian’s rule. 
 Josephus concluded his discussion of the Roman civil war by detailing its end and 
characterizing the event as a whole: “So Vespasian’s good fortune succeeded to his 
wishes everywhere, and the public affairs were, for the greatest part, already in his hands; 
upon which he considered that he had not arrived at the government without divine 
providence, but that a righteous kind of fate had brought the empire under his power.”248 
Josephus made it sound as if the civil war was resolved easily because of Vespasian’s 
luck, which it obviously was not. It is also implied that Vespasian succeeded because he 
was a good man. The Flavians undoubtedly supported these ideas: that fate and fortune 
made Vespasian emperor because he was a good man and suited to the position, and 
while the war itself was unfortunate the result was a happy one. This could certainly have 
been Josephus’ honest opinion of the war, but it does make his account problematic. 
 Despite calling Vespasian the only emperor to become better by exercising power, 
Tacitus’ characterization of the war was much different. This goes beyond Tacitus’ 
characterization of Vespasian as passive and his low opinion of Fate and Fortune. As 
already discussed, Tacitus felt that the only change brought by the civil war was who was 
in power, rather than how he ruled.249 Specifically, Vespasian’s supporters were depicted 
as no better than those who came before. Such men were, for Tacitus, if anything a bigger 
problem for Rome than the emperors themselves.250 More importantly, while Vespasian, 
and other historians, might have claimed that Vespasian’s hands were clean of bloodshed, 
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Tacitus did not absolve him of having led a civil war.251 After all Tacitus did not single 
out Vitellius or any one emperor when discussing the destruction of the Capitol. He says 
principum, a use of the plural which implies that he blamed all four of the emperors of 69 
for that crime, the greatest of the civil war.252 Regardless of what the Flavians claimed, 
Tacitus assigned them a part of the blame. 
 There is little difference between the sequence of events as given by Josephus and 
that of Tacitus, although Josephus’ is the simpler narrative.253 Where there are 
discrepancies, there is no clear way of telling who was right. Both historians had clear 
reasons for depicting things the way they did, although scholarship favors Tacitus as the 
more accurate of the two, despite Josephus’ status as an eye-witness. The real difference, 
however, lies in how these two authors characterized the people and events of 69. 
 All told Josephus’ relationship with and patronage by Vespasian makes it likely 
that his account was at least in accord with the Flavian ‘party line.’ His glowing praise of 
Vespasian and the apparent factual errors of his account support this conclusion. That the 
civil war was only a concern secondary to Josephus’ focus, the Jewish War, makes this 
seem all the more likely. However, Josephus is still a useful source for the Roman civil 
war, since his history gives us a look at what the Flavian’s ‘official’ depiction of the war 
might have been. It provides an outside view of Roman politics and an account of events 
with which the other authors discussed were probably familiar.254  
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CHAPTER V 
 
PLUTARCH 
 
 The Greek biographer Plutarch (c. 46-120) dealt with the civil war of 69 in his 
biographies of the emperors Galba and Otho. These were part of a series of biographies 
on the emperors from Augustus to Vitellius of which only these two survive in their 
entirety. This series of Imperial Lives differs from Plutarch’s more famous Parallel Lives 
in that there is a stronger thread of narrative and comparatively more concern for events 
beyond the actions of and on the emperor.255 It was noted, even in antiquity, that these 
two Lives were a linked pair and they were often reproduced for the moral lessons they 
taught about civil war and proper behavior.256 It is uncertain whether this was a unique 
feature or part of the whole series. 
 Plutarch was a wealthy provincial aristocrat from Chaeronea, in Greece. Aside 
from a prodigious writing career he participated actively in local government and was a 
priest of Apollo at Delphi.257 He was a noted partisan of the Greek people and travelled to 
Rome on several occasions to represent his city. These trips, as well as the popularity of 
his writing, earned him many friends in Rome.258 Plutarch’s literary accomplishments 
eventually earned him Roman citizenship and honors granted by both Trajan and 
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Hadrian.259  Most importantly for the study of these Lives, however, is the fact that 
Plutarch was a Platonist and thus interested in the ideals of moderate and proper action.260 
 As with the previous authors, some mention must be made of Plutarch’s sources 
before we delve into his characterizations. As with Tacitus and Josephus, we know very 
little about Plutarch’s sources. Like Josephus, however, Plutarch was an adult in 69 and 
likely heard about many of these events as they occurred, although he was not a 
participant in the war.261 Plutarch, by his own admission, came to Latin only later in his 
life and was not particularly good at it. However, since many Romans knew Greek this is 
unlikely to have hindered any inquiries he made on the war, although it has been 
questioned how well he understood what sources he had.262 That Plutarch did make 
inquiries is supported by the fact that he says he was shown around the battlefield at 
Bedriacum and saw Otho’s tomb.263 There is evidence, to be discussed in depth later, that 
Plutarch primarily based these biographies on several Roman accounts of the war, also 
used by Tacitus.264 It is widely accepted in the scholarly community that Plutarch cut this 
string of biographies off before Vespasian, because they were written during the reign of 
Domitian, Vespasian’s son, or under his immediate successor Nerva and thus would have 
been politically, and perhaps even personally, dangerous.265 
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 Unfortunately, no opening or programmatic statement gives us Plutarch’s stated 
aims. Presumably this would have been at the beginning of the Life of Augustus. 
Therefore, we shall begin with Plutarch’s characterization of Galba. As was common in 
biography, Plutarch gave an overall judgment of Galba at the emperor’s death:  
Having lived in great honor and reputation in the reigns of five emperors, 
insomuch that he overthrew Nero rather by his fame and repute in the world than 
by actual force and power. . . But being now overcome with age, he was indeed 
among the troops and legions an upright ruler upon the antique model; but for the 
rest giving himself to Vinius, Laco, and his freedmen, who make their gain of all 
things, no otherwise than Nero had done to his insatiate favorites, he left none 
behind him to wish him still in power, though many to compassionate his 
death.266 
 
Plutarch implied here that Gabla was such an upright and moral man that he toppled Nero 
simply by existing. While other sources do agree that Galba gave the rebellion political 
legitimacy, they also agree that Nero fell to his own panic rather than to Galba’s virtue.267 
The only flaw that Plutarch gave Galba in this obituary is that his age made him too 
reliant on corrupt men.268 Plutarch therefore implied that it was the shortcomings in 
others, rather than in Galba, that brought down his reign.269 The corrupt soldiery saw him 
as antiquated, his unworthy favorites ruined his reputation, and Rome itself was so 
corrupt that none wished him in power. Thus Plutarch seemed to make Galba an 
exemplar of the dangers of corrupt times to a good man.270 The virtues themselves, 
especially ‘honor,’ honos, were also used by Galba on his coins. 
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 Interestingly, Tacitus used some of the same language and ideas as Plutarch in his 
own obituary of Galba. While Plutarch did write earlier than Tacitus, and was well 
known, it is the consensus among scholars that Tacitus did not base his account on 
Plutarch’s, although it is unknown whether or not Tacitus knew Plutarch.271 Instead, it is 
argued that both used the same source, or set of sources, for their narratives.272 It is also 
consensus that Plutarch followed these sources closely while Tacitus rearranged things 
and added other evidence.273 Many favor Tacitus as the ‘more accurate’ of the two, but 
this does not address the question of how following, or not following, would affect their 
characterizations.274 While Tacitus spoke of Galba’s successes under previous emperors, 
he implied that this was more to do with luck than Galba being a ‘good man’. The greater 
difference is that Tacitus put much greater weight on Galba’s poor decisions, although he 
too called Galba old-fashioned.275 In his final judgment, while Tacitus had sympathy for 
Galba, he ultimately felt that he was not suited to be emperor, regardless of how good he 
may have looked on paper because he had a better sense than Plutarch of what made 
someone capax imperii.276 
 Plutarch’s main criticism of Galba, aside from trusting his advisors too much, was 
the poor job Galba did in attempting to recoup the money wasted by Nero. While 
Plutarch did credit Galba for the attempt he was forced to admit that the method Galba 
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chose was not only a failure but also detrimental to the state, and his reign.277 Plutarch did 
not depict Galba’s failings as bringing about his end, however, but rather the 
unwillingness of the Roman people and soldiery to accept his moral way of ruling.278 
This way of ruling, perhaps an attempt by Galba to establish legitimacy based on moral 
superiority, was popular with some but, unfortunately and terminally for Galba, was not 
popular the army and the plebs.279 
“when they heard of this, they conceived an implacable hatred against him. . . 
This heartburning, however, was as yet at Rome a thing undeclared, and a certain 
respect for Galba’s personal presence somewhat retarded their motions, and took 
off their edge, and their having no obvious occasion for beginning a revolution 
curbed and kept under, more or less, their resentments.”280 
 
Plutarch placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the soldiers. They hated Galba 
because he would not fulfill their greed, and they are so unruly that they would not even 
take their grievances to him.281 Plutarch also praised Galba’s authority as being sufficient 
to check these feelings but also set the stage for Otho by saying that the soldiers needed 
an occasion to begin a revolution against Galba, an occasion that Otho would provide. 
 Additionally, Plutarch characterized Galba as sacrificing his personal desires for 
the state: “but Galba, in all his actions, showed clearly that he preferred the public good 
before his own private interest, not aiming so much to pleasure himself as to advantage 
the Romans by his selection.”282 Plutarch characterized Galba’s adoption of Piso as being 
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for the good of the state, rather than what he would have wished for himself. Plutarch did 
not address the problem mentioned by our other sources, however, namely that while 
Piso may have been good for the state, he was not what the army or people wanted.283 
Plutarch carried this idea of self-sacrifice to its conclusion at Galba’s death: 
He, however, offered his throat, bidding them ‘strike, if it be for the Romans’ 
good. . .But those that were with him would not allow him to keep it covered up, 
but bade him let every one see the brave deed he had done; so that after a while he 
struck upon the lance the head of the aged man that had been their grave and 
temperate ruler, their supreme priest and consul, and tossing it up in the air, ran 
like a bacchanal, twirling and flourishing with it, while the blood ran down the 
spear.284 
 
Plutarch’s view was that Galba faced his end with the hope that the soldiers would take 
the good of Rome into account.285 As the rest of the passage shows, however, that is not 
what the soldiers had in mind. Plutarch used this display to underline, one last time, the 
difference between Galba’s morality and the immorality of the times.286 
 Tacitus characterized Galba’s death in much the same manner: “alii suppliciter 
interrogasse quid mali meruisset, paucos dies exolvendo donativo deprecatum: plures 
obtulisse ultro percussoribus iugulum: agerent ac ferirent, si ita <e> re publica videretur. 
non interfuit occidentium quid diceret. de percussore non satis constat.”287 While 
acknowledging a competing story, alii suppliciter interrogasse, Tacitus also favored the 
account that Galba faced his end nobly and ‘for the good of the commonwealth.’ si ita 
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<e> re publica. Tacitus also mentioned that ‘many barbaric wounds and savage 
mutilations were given to the body,’ pleraque vulnera feritate et saevitia trunco iam 
corpori adiecta, but the perpetrators are not singled out and it is merely part of the 
chaotic scene, whereas Plutarch focused his account on blaming those responsible.288 It is 
possible that Plutarch used this focus to underline both the tragedy of Galba’s death and 
the ferocity of the soldiers. It is equally possible that Tacitus manipulated the account to 
underscore how out of place and out of touch Galba was. Tacitus certainly did not attach 
the same kind of selflessness to Galba. In fact, Tacitus criticized Galba for not realizing 
that more than morality was needed to rule Rome. It is a question left unexplored in any 
extant author as to whether Galba’s moral stance was real or the typical moral superiority 
that was employed to gain legitimacy. Certainly, these accounts of Galba’s actions can be 
seen in several different lights.289 Regardless of whether Galba’s morality was real or 
feigned, Plutarch still characterized him and his reign based on his perceived morality 
and Tacitus, while acknowledging said morality, chose to underline Galba’s poor choices 
in his attempt to either be or appear moral. 
 Plutarch’s characterization of Otho was clear from the moment he introduced him 
into the narrative of the Life of Galba:290 
Here, it is related, no more than twenty-three received and saluted him emperor; 
so that, although he was not in mind as in body enervated with soft living and 
effeminacy, being in his nature bold and fearless enough in danger, nevertheless, 
he was afraid to go on. But the soldiers that were present would not suffer him to 
recede, but came with their swords drawn around his chair.291 
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Plutarch characterized Otho based on Otho inability to free his mind completely from the 
degradation of his body and lifestyle. His courage, which Plutarch damned with faint 
praise, is unable to carry through with a plan which he hashed. This left the soldiers in 
control. Plutarch clearly thought little of Otho, characterizing him as stirring up and 
focusing the anger of the Praetorian Guard but unable muster the courage to see the plot 
through.292 Plutarch’s Otho was, therefore, a weak and immoral character, unfit to rule 
Rome.293 
 While Tacitus certainly focused on Otho’s immoral lifestyle and the weaknesses 
in his character, he also gave Otho credit for some positive attributes as well: “Quis ad 
vos processerim commilitones, dicere non possum, quia nec privatum me vocare sustineo 
princeps a vobis nominatus, nec principem alio imperante. vestrum quoque nomen in 
incerto erit donec dubitabitur imperatorem populi Romani in castris an hostem 
habeatis.”294 Tacitus made Otho seem both calm and in control as he is encouraging the 
Praetorian Guard to support his coup. This speech, likely a Tacitean construction, also 
gave Otho credit for the clever tactic of linking the Guard’s fate with his own, saying 
‘your title is likewise in uncertainty,’ vestrum quoque nomen in incerto erit.295 While 
Tacitus did acknowledge the chaos unleashed by Otho’s coup and was critical of his rise 
to power, he nevertheless gave Otho credit for both inner strength and outward 
authority.296 
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 Plutarch’s judgment of Otho carried over into his descriptions of how Otho ruled 
in Rome. Plutarch depicted Otho as striving to please the people of Rome, to his own 
detriment at times, even going so far as to take the name Nero on the people’s wishes.297 
A link reinforced by Otho’s employment of many of Nero’s coin types. To Plutarch, such 
pandering was unfit for a Princeps and immoral as well.298 What Plutarch admitted but 
glossed over was that when Otho realized that using the name Nero angered the senate, 
he stopped.299 Plutarch likely intended this to be further proof of Otho’s indecisive 
character.300 Another reading, however, is that Otho was, unlike Galba, capable of 
perceiving and learning from his mistakes. 
 Plutarch used Otho’s indecisiveness to explain why Otho offered battle at 
Bedriacum, even though waiting would have been more beneficial to him: 
Otho also himself seems not to have shown the proper fortitude in bearing up 
against the uncertainty, and, out of effeminacy and want of use, had not patience 
for the calculations of danger, and was so uneasy at the apprehension of it that he 
shut his eyes, and like one going to leap from a precipice, left everything to 
fortune.301 
 
Once more, Plutarch’s Otho is unable to maintain mental fortitude and overcome the 
‘effeminacy’ of his character.302 For Plutarch, this is both why Otho lost the battle of 
Bedriacum and why his rule ultimately failed. He was unable to face uncertainty and thus 
gambled rather than planned. Plutarch credited Otho with only one moment of strength in 
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his entire depiction, and only after Otho had decided on suicide: “out of regard to their 
safety, he showed himself once more in public, but not with a gentle aspect and in a 
persuading manner as before; on the contrary, with a countenance that discovered 
indignation and authority, he commanded such as were disorderly to leave the place, and 
was not disobeyed.”303 Thus we have another of Plutarch’s lessons on morality, Otho 
found strength only after he had decided upon committing suicide for the good of Rome. 
 Plutarch’s description of Otho’s decision to kill himself also highlighted a further 
moral lesson: “Believe it many times over, I can die with more honor than I can reign. 
For I cannot see at all how I should do any such great good to my country by gaining the 
victory, as I shall by dying to establish peace and unanimity and to save Italy from such 
another unhappy day.”304 Plutarch posited two reasons why Otho decided to kill himself 
rather than keep fighting. First, Otho despaired of winning.305 He had already lost one 
battle and could neither foresee victory nor bear the strain of trying. Second, Otho 
realized that he was a detriment to Rome.306 Plutarch implied with this speech that Otho’s 
realization that he was a detriment to Rome meant that he had to commit suicide. Under 
Plutarch’s morality Otho could not be redeemed and rule better, once the realization came 
to him he had not choice but to die in order to cleanse Rome of himself. 
 As already noted, Tacitus did discuss the divide between Otho’s lifestyle and his 
action, but for him the relationship was more complex than it appeared in Plutarch. 
Tacitus certainly did not hide what he perceived as Otho’s immorality, but at the same 
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time he often complimented Otho for his good action, albeit grudgingly. Specifically, 
Tacitus characterized Otho’s decision to commit suicide in a more positive light. Rather 
than despairing or criticizing himself, Otho calmly asks ‘whether I can allow so many 
Roman youths, and such a distinguished army to be scattered again and be snatched away 
from the stat,’ an ego tantum Romanae pubis, tot egregios exercitus sterni rursus et rei 
publicae eripi patiar?, which Tacitus implies he could have done, ne plus quam semel.307 
Once more, while both authors’ sequences of events were notably similar, their 
characterization of Otho was notably different. 
 As a final note of comparison, we shall look at the way in which both Plutarch 
and Tacitus summarized the character of Otho: “He died in his thirty eighth year, after a 
short reign of about three months, his death being as much applauded as his life was 
censured, for if he lived no better than Nero, he died more nobly.”308 “Duobus 
facinoribus, altero flagitiosissimo, altero egregio, tantundem apud posteros meruit bonae 
famae quantum malae.”309 Once more, Plutarch and Tacitus presented similar 
descriptions but with different focuses. Plutarch focused on Otho’s immoral life and gave 
praise to his death. Tacitus, however, juxtaposed Otho’s ‘noble,’ egregio, death with the 
‘most despicable,’ flagitiossimo coup which brought him to power. It is his coup, rather 
than his lifestyle, which earned Otho the most censure from Tacitus, who praised him for 
the manner of his death rather than merely praising the death itself. Thus the differences 
in characterization: Plutarch, interested in morality, focused on Otho’s lifestyle while 
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Tacitus, interested in whether Otho was capax imperii, focused on the paradox between 
that lifestyle and his actions. 
 Despite the differences between how they characterized the emperors of 69, both 
Plutarch and Tacitus viewed the civil war itself in similar ways: 
letters passed between the two, conveying bitter and shameful terms of reproach, 
which were not false indeed, for that matter, only it was senseless and ridiculous 
for each to assail the other with accusations to which both alike must plead guilty. 
For it were hard to determine which of the two had been most profuse, most 
effeminate, which was most novice in military affairs, and most involved in debt 
through previous want of means.310 
 
Plutarch used this passage to highlight both the hypocrisy of the rival claims of Otho and 
Vitellius to the Principate and the fact that both claimants were corrupt. Tacitus recorded 
the same exchange of letters and made the same point with them as well. Tacitus 
underlined this by citing a contemporary aphorism: “quorum bello solum id scires, 
deteriorem fore qui vicisset” or ‘you can only learn from this war that whowever was 
worse shall have conquered.’311 Thus Plutarch and Tacitus agreed that neither Otho nor 
Vitellius was entirely suited to empire, although Tacitus is elsewhere more 
complimentary towards Otho. 
 This brings us to Plutarch’s brief description of Vitellius. Since we are missing 
the Life of Vitellius, we are left with only a few comments on how Vitellius began his rise 
to power, such as: 
He had hitherto seemed to decline it, professing a dread he had to undertake the 
weight of the government; but on this day, being fortified, they say, by wine and a 
plentiful noon-day repast, he began to yield, and submitted to take on him the title 
of Germanicus they gave him, but desired to be excused as to that of Caesar. And 
immediately the army under Flaccus, putting away their fine and popular oaths in 
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the name of the senate, swore obedience to Vitellus as emperor, to observe 
whatever he commanded.312 
 
Unlike Otho who was at least daring in his ambitions, if not always in their execution, 
Vitellius was characterized by Plutarch as fearing to become emperor and then agreeing 
anyway, persuaded by drink.313 It is likely that the central thread of Plutarch’s 
characterization of Vitellius was that Vitellius was weak willed and did whatever was 
asked of him.314 While the, at least feigned, fear of becoming emperor or taking office 
was common enough in Roman politics the fact that Plutarch adds the idea that Vitellius 
did not start yielding until he was drunk implies true fear of the position and/or a weak 
will.315 Plutarch also characterized the soldiers here as being fickle, changing their oaths 
at the drop of a hat. As with Tacitus and Josephus, it is unclear whether this 
characterization of Vitellius was based on the Flavian ‘party-line.’ This does read as 
Plutarch’s typical focus on morality, however, namely the prominence of alcohol in 
persuading Vitellius to be declared emperor and the depiction of the oaths to the senate as 
‘fine and popular’ even though it is unlikely either was the case among most soldiers. 
This could also be Plutarch making use of Vitellius’ repeated claims on his coinage that 
he was the ‘choice of the army,’ Consensus Exercitum. 
 Tacitus has a good deal more characterization of Vitellius, since his entire account 
of the war survives, but when we focus solely on Vitellius’ acclamation, several key 
differences emerge. Tacitus characterized Vitellius as both consenting to and desiring to 
be declared emperor. In addition, he also claimed that the German legions’ oath to the 
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Senate was ‘empty oath,’ sacramentum inane, while they decided who they ‘pleased to 
offer the Principate,’ offerri principem placuit.316 While relating the embarkation of the 
German legions to civil war, Tacitus did ascribe the same vices to Vitellius as did 
Plutarch, however: 
medio diei temulentus et sagina gravis, cum tamen ardor et vis militum ultro ducis 
munia implebat, ut si adesset imperator et strenuis vel ignavis spem metumve 
adderet. instructi intentique signum profectionis exposcunt. nomen Germanici 
Vitellio statim additum: Caesarem se appellari etiam victor prohibuit.317 
 
Tacitus showed the soldiers as not fickle but ‘ardent,’ ardor, in their loyalty to Vitellius 
and both competent and organized as well since they are said to be so loyal to him that 
they were ‘fulfilling their duties unaided by the generals,’ ultro ducis munia implebat. 
Tacitus characterized Vitellius as willing enough to declare himself emperor, but he also 
says that ‘Vitellius assumed the Principate for the sake of stagnant luxury and lavish 
feasts,’ Vitellius et fortunam principatus inerti luxu ac prodigis epulis praesumebat.318 
Despite differing on the particulars, Plutarch and Tacitus both depict Vitellius as being 
weak, indolent, and wholly unfit to rule.319 
 Having looked at Plutarch’s characterization of three of the emperors of 69 all 
that remains is to look at what he thought of the civil war as a whole. Plutarch gave the 
following characterization to the topic: 
But the calamities of the Roman government might be likened to the motions of 
the giants that assailed heaven, convulsed as it was, and distracted, and from 
every side recoiling, as it were, upon itself, not so much by the ambition of those 
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who were proclaimed emperors, as by the covetousness and license of the 
soldiery, who drove commander after commander out, like nails on upon 
another.320 
 
At first glance this is a standard depiction of the horrors of civil war, and doesn’t really 
delve into cause.321 What is unique, however, is that Plutarch blamed the desires of the 
soldiers, rather than the ambitions of the emperors, for causing the civil war; a common 
platonic idea.322 This can be traced back to Plutarch’s moral judgments. While Plutarch 
was certainly not wrong, the soldiers did commit terrible crimes and without their 
discontent the war would not have been possible, for him this is all that matters. Soldiers 
were supposed to serve the emperor loyally, and since they were not doing so, Plutarch 
judged it immoral and therefore the problem.323 The issue is not that this viewpoint is 
illegitimate but that Plutarch’s broad-stroke characterization ignores both the larger 
grievances of the soldiers against their commanders and the emperors and the role of the 
commanders who prompted them to many of the crimes they committed.324 
 As already noted, Tacitus placed greater blame on the commanders: "multi in 
utroque exercitu sicut modesti quietique ita mali et strenui. sed profusa cupidine et insigni 
temeritate legati legionum Alienus Caecina et Fabius Valens.”325 Tacitus’ view on the 
soldiery is multi-faceted in that he recognized that ‘some where disciplined and quiet and 
others were wicked and vigorous,’ sicut modesti quietique ita mali et strenui. Tacitus did 
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not ignore the fact that many were unprincipled or the terrible crimes some of them 
committed; but placed the most of the blame on the ‘commanders of the legions,’ legati 
legionum who Tacitus called ‘excessive in desire and singular in daring,’ profuse 
cupidine et insigni temeritate.326 This is not to say that Tacitus denied agency to the 
soldiers. For example his narrative of Otho’s coup mentions: “suscepere duo manipulares 
imperium populi Romani transferendum et transtulerunt.”327 Again, however, even 
though Tacitus gave ‘two soldiers,’ duo manipulares the key role in ‘transferring the rule 
of the Roman people,’ imperium populi Romani transferendum, they were still acting at 
the behest of Otho. 
 The difference between Plutarch and Tacitus in their characterizations of the army 
is perhaps best seen in the way they each dealt with the rumor that both armies, Otho’s 
and Vitellius’, would abandon their commanders and join together. Plutarch wrote: 
But others would tell you that there were many movements in both armies for 
acting in concert; and if it were possible for them to agree, then they should 
proceed to choose one of their most experience officers that were present; if not, 
they should convene the senate, and invest it with the power of election. And it is 
not improbable that, neither of the emperors then bearing the title having really 
any reputation, such purposes were really entertained among the genuine, 
serviceable, and sober-minded part of the soldiers.328 
 
Plutarch, once more, characterized the soldiers as being fickle, willing to betray their 
chosen emperors for someone more acceptable to them. This showed the soldiers as only 
interested in what would be beneficial to themselves. Even the good soldiers are shown 
as entertaining the idea of betraying those they had sworn loyalty too. It is possible that 
this is meant to mean that the good soldiers had realized their commanders weren’t worth 
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following. Either way, however, the passage reinforces Plutarch’s characterization of the 
soldiers as being the main driving force behind the civil war. 
 Tacitus recounted the same rumor and even acknowledged some of the same 
opinions but he, however, gave a more concrete reason why such a thing could not occur: 
Invenio apud quosdam auctores pavore belli seu fastidio utriusque principis, 
quorum flagitia ac dedecus apertiore in dies fama noscebantur, dubitasse exercitus 
num posito certamine vel ipsi in medium consultarent, vel senatui permitterent 
legere imperatorem;. . . ego ut concesserim apud paucos tacito voto quietem pro 
discordia, bonum et innocentem principem pro pessimis ac flagitiosissimis 
expetitum. . . sperasse corruptissimo saeculo tantam vulgi moderationem reor ut 
qui pacem belli amore turbaverant, bellum pacis caritate deponerent, neque aut 
exercitus linguis moribusque dissonos in hunc consensum potuisse coalescere, aut 
legatos ac duces magna ex parte luxus egestatis scelerum sibi conscios nisi 
pollutum obstrictumque meritis suis principem passuros.”329 
 
Tacitus credited ‘among a few was the secret desire for peace rather than discord,’ apud 
paucos tacito voto quietem pro discordia, but he once more focused on the commanders. 
Tacitus showed these ‘commanders,’ legatos ac duces, as being so profligate that they 
furthered the civil war just so that someone ‘beholden to themselves,’ meritis suis, could 
become emperor. Thus Tacitus argued they would have prevented any such merging of 
the armies. Tacitus also spoke well of the loyalty of the army, especially in relation to the 
officers.330  For example, when Caecina betrayed Vitellius and tried to turn the army over 
to Vespasian the soldiers ‘restored Vitellius’ images and threw Caecina in chains,’ 
repositis Vitellii imaginibus vincla Caecinae iniciunt.331 Tacitus often portrayed the army 
very well. Even Vitellius’ soldiers are shown as loyal, albeit to a bad cause. For Tacitus, 
it is the emperors and commanders who drove on the civil war. 
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 As a biographer, Plutarch discussed the actions of people and groups other than 
his subject but little.332 Concerning the plebs of Rome, Plutarch said almost nothing of 
substance. Generally Plutarch confined himself to general comments about what the 
people’s reactions were to various events, with such phrases as “and thus the mass of the 
people began to look with dislike upon the government” after having listed some of 
Galba’s unpopular acts or “the people applauded, giving loud acclamations” after one 
soldier claimed that he had killed Otho.333 Taken together this has the effect of making 
the mob seem fickle, without directly characterizing them as such. Plutarch gave only 
only comment of any substance on the plebs, right before Galba was killed: “Upon this, 
the crowd of people set off running, not to fly and disperse, but to possess themselves of 
the colonnades and elevated places of the forum, as it might be to get places to see a 
spectacle.”334 This depiction of the Roman mob, as fickle and desiring to be entertained 
fits in well with Tacitus’ equally negative portrayal of them, as well as Plutarch’s general 
characterization of Rome as having been inherintely corrupt at the time. 
 Plutarch’s depiction of the Roman senate, as sparse as his direct characterization 
of the plebs, shared many of the same characteristics as Tacitus’, but was less 
understanding of their position. Plutarch described the Senate’s actions thus after Galba 
had been assassinated: “Forthwith a senate was convened, and as if they were not the 
same men, or had other gods to swear by, they took the oath in Otho’s name which he 
himself had take in Galbas and had broken; and withal conferred on him the titles of 
Caesar and Augustus; whilst the dead carcasses of the slain lay yet in their consular robes 
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in the market-place.”335 Plutarch here criticized the Senate for swearing the oath to Otho, 
despite the fact that they had no other alternative, and painted the scene as if they had 
betrayed Galba, who was dead.336 Notably absent here is either the sympathy Tacitus 
showed for the difficult position the Senate was in with regard to the emperor, as he 
himself would have known well, or the characterization of the senate as trying to assert 
their role in Roman politics any way they possibly could, as Tacitus, in the same scene, 
and the later lex de imperio Vespasiani demonstrated. Plutarch furthered his 
characterization of the Senate and nobility in a later passage which states: “So that the 
nobility and chief of the people, who were at first apprehensive that no human creature, 
but some supernatural, or penal vindictive power had seized the empire, began now to 
flatter themselves with hopes of a government that smiled upon them thus early.”337 This 
scene comes after Otho had made several propitiatory gestures to the senate and thus 
Plutarch has the senate, at first wisely wary of Otho, being flattered into thinking that he 
will turn out well as emperor. Thus, much as with the above scene, Plutarch used his 
depiction of the Senate to further his general characterization of the emperor, in this case 
that Otho was corrupt but skilled in fooling people. Plutarch’s characterization of the 
Senate is thus more negative then Tacitus, although Tacitus’ characterization was also 
critical, and did not attempt to understand the senate’s difficult position. 
 It becomes clear in this comparison that Plutarch and Tacitus were using the same 
set of sources and told basically the same story. Tacitus was more detailed but the nature 
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of history in relation to biography allowed him to be.338 The real difference here is 
between what these two authors chose to focus on.339 Plutarch’s focus was largely on the 
morality of individuals and the moral lessons which could be read from events. While 
Tacitus himself focused on morality, it was more the necessities of good government 
rather than the more philosophical morality of Plutarch. Tacitus gave his characters 
greater depth and focused on the paradox between action and appearance.340 Plutarch’s 
main theme was the importance of morality in government. Tacitus’ was the suitability of 
these men for government and the corrupting effect of the Principate. 
 Plutarch is useful as a source on 69 for several reasons. Firstly, these Lives give 
invaluable insight into how Greek intellectuals may have seen the Roman Empire.341 
More generally, he provided us with information on how provincials might have 
perceived events in Rome and hint at their investment in the Empire.342 Secondly, these 
two biographies were popular in Rome, which indicates that viewing the war as a moral 
lesson was popular among the Roman elite. Thirdly, the comparison of these biographies 
and Tacitus’ Histories demonstrates how two men could look at the same information 
and reach different opinions about it. While at times Tacitus’ more complex 
characterizations might seem superior, Plutarch’s moral viewpoint still provides 
invaluable insight into the characters and events of 69. Specifically, Plutarch’s viewpoint 
on these events focused on the motives and morals of the people involved. While this 
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view can be problematic at times, such as Plutarch’s difficulty in looking past the 
lifestyles of the emperors to what they were actually doing and his assuming motive 
based on the actions of larger groups, this still provides the modern reader with an insight 
into how these emperors presented themselves, and how that presentation was viewed by 
others. 
 
 84
CHAPTER VI 
 
SUETONIUS 
 
 Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus (c.70-130) was a Roman biographer who dealt with 
the ‘year of the four emperors’ in four of his De Vita Caesarum, a work covering the 
emperors from Julius Caesar to Domitian. Its exact dates of publication are unknown but 
likely during the reign of Hadrian, whom Suetonius served as ab epistulis for a time. 
 Suetonius was born at Hippo Regius, in Africa. He was of the Equestrian order 
and his father had served Otho as a military tribune. Suetonius’ cognomen ‘Tranquillus’ 
points to a date of birth close to the conclusion of the civil war. Nothing is known of 
Suetonius’ family aside from his father. From what we can gather from Pliny the 
Younger’s letters, Pliny being Suetonius’ patron, the young biographer had no interest in 
a public career and resisted Pliny’s attempt to get him one. It was only after Pliny’s death 
in 113 that Suetonius gained the prestigious posts of ‘chief librarian’ and then later ab 
epistulis to the new Emperor Hadrian. Suetonius’ constant contact with the emperor 
would have given him enormous influence. Suetonius lost this position due to a scandal 
involving the empress and seems to have retired from public life until his death a decade 
later, although some have argued that he got the position back several years later.343 
 Suetonius was an avid scholar, writing biographies of men in every field of 
human endeavor; all save The Twelve Caesars, his most famous, are now lost.344 One of 
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Pliny’s letters, however, described Suetonius as a man who was hesitant to publish his 
work, perhaps for fear of public attention or retaliation.345 
Perfectum opus absolutumque est, nec iam splendescit lima sed atteritur. Patere 
me videre titulum tuum, patere audire describi legi venire volumina Tranquilli 
mei. Aequum est nos in amore tam mutuo eandem percipere ex te voluptatem, qua 
tu perfrueris ex nobis. Vale.346 
 
Pliny prided himself on his judgment of literary merit so clearly thought his praise, that it 
was ‘perfect and finished,’ perfectum opus absolutumque est, should be enough to 
convince Suetonius to publish. Suetonius comes off here as perhaps something of a 
perfectionist, wishing to ‘revise,’ lima, his work yet again before publishing it. Since he 
turned down a public career on several occasions, it is also possible that he was merely 
reluctant to submit his work to public scrutiny. It should be noted that Pliny was pushing 
for Suetonius to publish in part because him doing so would reflect well on Pliny too. 
 The Twelve Caesars represents a biographical tradition that is distinctly different 
from the Greek tradition in which Plutarch was writing.347 While Suetonius began and 
ended each biography chronologically, dealing with the subject’s origin and death, he 
wrote the bulk of his work thematically rather than narratively. Suetonius treated every 
theme by detailing good and bad actions taken by the emperor. He also recounted 
anecdotes and rumors alongside provable facts.348 This style results in these biographies 
being less overtly judgmental than the other works we have dealt with although Suetonius 
certainly manipulated things in order to make certain points.349 On the one hand, there is 
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less rhetoric or judgment with which the reader must contend. On the other hand, these 
contradictory and often unexplained stories make understanding more difficult.350 
Suetonius’ choice of anecdotes, however, does reveal an interest in the way power 
corrupts, the actions of the Princeps, and how those actions were perceived. The biggest 
problem in treating Suetonius’ biographies, however, is that he rarely mentioned anyone 
save the emperor. This focused almost all praise and blame for events onto the emperor, 
whether deserving or not.351 
 As we have done with all the previous authors, we must detail Suetonius’ sources 
before moving on to how he characterized the civil war of 69. As ab epistulis, Suetonius 
would have had access to a wealth of information in the imperial archives. For 69 
specifically, he had his father’s recollections of serving in the war as well as a variety of 
other published accounts. As with Tacitus and Plutarch, what these sources were and how 
much he used them is unknown. While he certainly had access to Plutarch’s Lives and 
Tacitus’ Histories, there is no evidence that Suetonius used either.352 However, it has 
been argued that the reason Suetonius’ biographies grew shorter and more superficial 
after the Augustus was because Tacitus’ recent publication made such detail 
unnecessary.353 It is also possible that he did not wish to compete with Tacitus, or felt that 
he could not; in fact when he does go into detail it seems that he was correcting 
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Tacitus.354 The other reason often given for this decline in quality is that he was removed 
from his position as ab epistulis after completing the Augustus and thus no longer had 
access to such detailed records.355 Both explanations are certainly possible and not 
mutually exclusive. 
 Moving on to how Suetonius characterized the emperors, we shall begin with his 
discussion of how Galba was perceived by the Roman people before entering the city: 
Praecesserat de eo fama saeuitiae simul atque auaritiae, quod ciuitates 
Hispaniarum Galliarumque, quae cunctantius sibi accesserant. . .ea fama et 
confirmata et aucta est, ut primum urbem introiit. nam cum classiarios, quos Nero 
ex remigibus iustos milites fecerat, redire ad pristinum statum cogeret, recusantis 
atque insuper aquilam et signa pertinacius flagitantis non modo inmisso equite 
disiecit, sed decimauit etiam. . .illa quoque uerene an falso per ludibrium 
iactabantur.356 
 
Suetonius depicted Galba as having earned a ‘reputation for greed and cruelty,’ fama 
saevitiae simul atque auaritiae, before he had even set foot in Rome, praecesserat.357 
Suetonius created this impression by mixing rumor with fact. The punishment of the 
townships was clearly a rumor that had reached Rome based on the use of the 
subjunctives punisset, adfecisset, conflasset, and iussisset. Galba’s entrance into the city, 
however, has a tone of fact to it saying his reputation was ‘confirmed and increased,’ 
confirmata et aucta and using the indicative verbs fecerat, disiecit, and decimauit. 
Suetonius acknowledged that there were many stories about Galba going around Rome 
both ‘true and false,’ uerene an falso. His purpose, however, was not to separate fact 
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from fiction but to show his readers how Galba was perceived both when he reached 
Rome and by later writers.358 
 Tacitus often did acknowledge varying stories and rumors concerning an event 
but always gave at least some indication of which account he thought correct rather than 
leaving it to the impression of his readers. This is demonstrated by the fact that Tacitus 
only depicted Galba’s ‘entrance into the city with thousands of unarmed soldiers 
slaughtered,’ introitus in urbem trucidatis tot milibus inermium militum.359 He did 
acknowledge, however, that Galba did have the faults of ‘avarice,’ avaritiam, and 
‘renowned strictness,’ celebrata severitas.360 The general character of Galba comes off 
better in Tacitus than it does in Suetonius. Tacitus portrayed him as a noble but notably 
flawed man. Suetonius made him seem greedy and uncaring. 
 What is notable about Suetonius’ method of characterization is the lack of both 
explanation and judgment: 
liberalitates Neronis non plus decimis concessis per quinquaginta equites R. ea 
condicione reuocandas curauit exigendasque, ut et si quid scaenici ac xystici 
donatum olim uendidissent, auferretur emptoribus, quando illi pretio absumpto 
soluere nequirent. at contra nihil non per comites atque libertos pretio addici aut 
donari gratia passus est.361 
 
Suetonius was so focused on Galba’s actions here that he did not take the trouble to 
explain to his reader Galba’s reasons for ‘recalling the gifts of Nero,’ liberalitates 
Neronis. . .reuocandas curauit, namely a desperate need of raising funds for the state, 
impoverished in part by Nero’s many gifts. There is no direct judgment, good or bad, of 
                                                 
358
 Murison, Galba Otho and Vitellius, 57; Wallace-Hadrill, Suetonius, 149. 
 
359
 Tacitus, Historiae, I.6. 
 
360
 Tacitus, Histories, I.5. 
 
361
 Suetonius, Galba, 15.1-2. 
 89
Galba here either, however. Tacitus referenced Galba’s unsound financial policies and 
Plutarch acknowledged that this strategy was foolish, but Suetonius let the action speak 
for itself.362 The only note of judgment is that ‘there was nothing (Galba implied) would 
not allow for his companions,’ at contra nihil non per comites. . .passus est, with the ab 
contra subtly highlighting Galba’s hypocracy.363 Another feature of Suetonius’ tight 
character focus is that he neither mentioned by name nor characterized Galba’s favorites 
and he certainly did not censure them for their corruption as both Plutarch and Tacitus 
do.364 However, the fact that Suetonius included this scene indicates that he intended for 
his audience to reach the conclusion that Galba’s plan was foolish.365 Suetonius’ direct 
accusation of hypocracy served to underline this implied judgment.366 Thus Suetonius led 
his readers towards specific characterizations, but did not overtly state them.  
 Another example of Suetonius’ style of characterization can be seen in his 
account of Galba’s decision to adopt Piso: “quod ut nuntiatum est, despectui esse non tam 
senectam suam quam orbitatem ratus, Pisonem Frugi Licinianum nobilem egregiumque 
iuuenem ac sibi olim probatissimum testamentoque semper in bona et nomen adscitum 
repente e media salutantium turba adprehendit.367 Suetonius definitely pushed his readers 
towards a specific conclusion, namely that Galba’s choice of Piso was poor, by making 
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the whole process sound ‘sudden,’ repente, and therefore arbitrary.368 This is supported 
by the fact that the characteristics Suetonius chose to ascribe to Piso make him sound 
unsuitable for rule. It is not that noble descent, nobilem, and distinguished character, 
egregiumque, were bad traits for the Romans, far from it, but Suetonius gave Piso no 
other characteristics for ruling, indicating that he was not suitable to the job.369 Suetonius 
underscored the point by directly calling Galba ‘senile,’ senectam. This characterization 
serves as the anchor for both parts of the above quote as it explains why Galba neither 
realized why he was being criticized nor that his choice of heir was a poor one. 
 All of our sources characterize Galba as failing to understand why he was being 
criticized and made a poor choice in adopting Piso. As already discussed, Tacitus 
elaborated this scene with a speech that depicts Galba as at least having his heart in the 
right place, in order to establish the precedent of adopting a successor. Therefore, 
Suetonius was merely trying to relay the facts and convey how Galba was perceived at 
the time while Tacitus was making a larger point about the Principate as an institution; 
these accounts are not mutually exclusive.370 
 Of all the authors we have discussed, Suetonius portrayed Otho in the most 
positive light. The common thought is that Suetonius characterized Otho positively to 
honor his father who served Otho during the war.371 However, this does not mean 
Suetonius was not critical of some aspects of Otho’s character:  
simili temeritate, quamuis dubium nemini esset quin trahi bellum oporteret, 
quando et fame et angustiis locorum urgeretur hostis, quam primum tamen 
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decertare statuit, siue impatiens longioris sollicitudinis speransque ante Vitelli 
aduentum profligari plurimum posse, siue impar militum ardori pugnam 
deposcentium. nec ulli pugnae affuit substititque Brixelli.372 
 
The central idea of this scene is Suetonius’ judgment that Otho ordering battle against 
Vitellius’ forces was ‘rash,’ temeritate.373 As usual, Suetonius gave several possibilities 
of why Otho decided to make this gamble ‘whether he was intolerant of longer anxiety,’ 
siue impatiens longioris sollicitudinis, ‘or unequal of military hardship,’ siue impar 
militum ardori, without direct comment although the central theme of the possibilities is 
Otho’s impatience. One can also interpret the final line of this passage as meaning that 
Otho ‘could not bear fighting,’ nec ulli pugnae affuit, and thus wanted to end the war 
quickly.374 This dislike for violence on Otho’s part is perhaps supported by Otho’s Pax 
Orbis Terrarum coins. Suetonius also previously characterized Otho as a gambler who 
launched his coup because ‘he would rather fall to an enemy in battle than his creditors in 
the forum,’ nihilque referre ab hoste in acie an in foro sub creditoribus caderet.375  
 Interestingly, Tacitus gave a speech to those who wished to wait for 
reinforcements at Bedriacum but did not give the side that wanted immediate battle the 
same courtesy. Many have argued that Tacitus did this to underline the foolishness of the 
decision to fight. It is possible that the reason all of our sources are vague on the point is 
that the defeated Othoniasts were unwilling to shed light on the decision which cost their 
party the civil war.376 Conversely there could well have been too much finger pointing to 
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sort out what actually happened. Suetonius’ explanation seems clearer than that of 
Tacitus and Plutarch, largely because in the absence of Otho’s subordinates the decision 
appears to be entirely his. Suetonius also differed from Tacitus and Plutarch on the 
strategic position of Vitellius’ army. Both stated that it was Otho’s army that was in a bad 
position, not Vitellius’. It is impossible to determine, however, how much Suetonius’ 
account is based on, or at least influenced by, the recollection of his father. 
 Suetonius’ style of reporting an incident without explanation or comment does 
make interpreting passages such as this rather difficult: 
ea cum in castris sub noctem promerentur, insidias quidam suspicati tumultum 
excitauerunt; ac repente omnes nullo certo duce in Palatium cucurrerunt caedem 
senatus flagitantes, repulsisque tribunorum qui inhibere temptabant, nonnullis et 
occisis, sic ut erant cruenti, ubinam imperator esset requirentes perruperunt in 
triclinium usque nec nisi uiso destiterunt.377 
 
This passage asks more questions than it answers: Why did the Guards ‘suspect 
treachery,’ insidias quidam suspicati? Why ‘drive away or kill the officers,’ repulsisque 
triunorum. . .nonnullis et occisis? Why did the guardsmen ‘calm down as soon as they 
saw Otho,’ nec nisi uiso destiterunt? This is a rare example of Suetonius depicting his 
subject, Otho, as being a passive participant, viso, in events. This is also a prime example 
of an event which Suetonius, possibly, gave minimal description to because it had already 
been dealt with by Tacitus.378 Ironically, given Suetonius’ close focus on the emperor’s 
actions; it was Tacitus who depicted Otho as active during this mutiny, ‘calming the 
soldiers with prayers and tears,’ insistens precibus et lacrimis aegre cohibuit.379 In 
Suetonius, this incident was used to demonstrate the loyalty of Otho’s soldiers. In 
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Tacitus, this incident gave an example of the corruption Otho’s coup brought to Rome.380 
For Plutarch, who gave another account of this event, this provided yet another example 
of Otho’s weak character, since he could not control the army.381 Once more, all three 
accounts are compatible.  
 Unsurprisingly, Suetonius gave Otho the most detailed characterization of extant 
authors in his account of Otho’s decision to commit suicide. The scene is also a rare 
example of Suetonius indicating which account of events was accurate, namely that Otho 
wished to free Rome from civil war rather than because he despaired of winning.382 By 
discounting the idea that Otho despaired of victory, Suetonius was directly challenging 
Plutarch’s account of events, or at least whatever source both based their accounts on. 
Suetonius’ positive characterization of Otho is explained and seen clearly in this passage: 
Interfuit huic bello pater meus Suetonius Laetus, tertiae decimae legionis tribunus 
angusticlauius. is mox referre crebro solebat Othonem etiam priuatum usque adeo 
detestatum ciuilia arma. . . nec concursurum cum Galba fuisse, nisi confideret sine 
bello rem transigi posse; tunc ad despiciendam uitam. . . hoc uiso proclamasse 
eum aiebat, non amplius se in periculum talis tamque bene meritos 
coniecturum.383 
 
That Suetonius deliberately cited his father, pater meus Suetonius Laetus, as evidence, 
referre crebro solebat, for his account of Otho’s suicide put tremendous weight behind 
his account, which reinforces the fact that Suetonius should not be automatically 
discounted because he was sometimes wrong or careless.384 Suetonius with this passage 
sought both to explain why Otho stayed out of the fighting at Bedriacum, that he 
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‘detested civil war,’ detestatum ciuilia arma, and to absolve him from some of the 
bloodshed of his coup, that he would not have done it ‘unless he were confident he could 
accomplish the thing without battle,’ nisi confideret sine bello rem transigi posse. This 
passage has also been seen as Suetonius’ direct challenge to Plutarch’s negative portrayal 
of Otho.385 Tacitus’ depiction was similar to Suetonius’, although his was more detailed 
and gave Otho a speech, but was in general less glowingly praising of Otho.386 
 Suetonius ended his Life of Otho with a brief obituary that, in language at least, 
mirrors the eulogies of Tacitus and Plutarch closely: 
Tanto Othonis animo nequaquam corpus aut habitus competit. . . per quae factum 
putem, ut mors eius minime congruens uitae maiore miraculo fuerit.. . . denique 
magna pars hominum incolumem grauissime detestata mortuum laudibus tulit, ut 
uulgo iactatum sit etiam, Galbam ab eo non tam dominandi quam rei p. ac 
libertatis restituendae causa interemptum.387 
 
Suetonius approached his obituary of Otho from the opposite direction. Whereas Plutarch 
viewed Otho as an immoral man whose death, mortuum, was in such sharp contrast to his 
life that it surprised everyone and earned Otho ‘praise,’ laudibus tulit, Suetonius 
acknowledged that praise and traced it to the same cause as Tacitus and Plutarch, ‘that his 
death was little like his life,’ ut mors eius minime congruens uitae. However, Suetonius 
implied that Otho was in fact a courageous man, tanto animo, but that this did not ‘agree 
with his body and habits,’ nequaquam corpus aut habitus competit.388 Thus his 
courageous death was surprising to those who judged him by his lifestyle which 
demonstrates once more the value put upon a noble death. This idea is even further 
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reinforced by Suetonius’ statement ‘that it was common opinion,’ ut uulgo iactatum sit 
etiam at the time that ‘Otho had overthrown Galba to restore liberty to the Republic,’ 
quam rei p. ac libertatis resituendae causa interemptum, indicating the amount of 
legitimacy gained from a good death.389 This also indicates that Otho may have, for a 
time at least, been more popular, or at least more fondly remembered, than either Tacitus 
or Plutarch gave him credit for. 
 While Suetonius’ characterization of Otho was more positive than Tacitus’ and 
Plutarch’s, his treatment of Vitellius was more typical. Like Plutarch, Suetonius gave 
Vitellius a passive role in his own ascension to the Principate: 
quare uixdum mense transacto, neque diei neque temporis ratione habita, ac iam 
uespere, subito a militibus e cubiculo raptus, ita ut erat in ueste domestica, 
imperator est consalutatus. . . consentiente deinde etiam superioris prouinciae 
exercitu, qui prior a Galba ad senatum defecerat, cognomen Germanici delatum 
ab uniuersis cupide recepit, Augusti distulit, Caesaris in perpetuum recusauit.390 
 
Suetonius’ characterization of this event was notably more ‘violent,’ raptus, than either 
Tacitus’ or Plutarch’s. Tacitus’ Vitellius was persuaded by his subordinates, and 
Plutarch’s was induced by drink, but Suetonius’ is ‘declared emperor,’ imperator est 
consulatutus, by ‘soldiers suddenly seizing him in the bedroom room,’ subito a militibus 
e cubiculo raptus. As with both Plutarch and Tacitus this could be seen as a recusatio, but 
there is no staged or attempted refusal depicted here, save for the title of Caesar, Caesaris 
in perpetuum recusauit, and rather than being persuaded there is a tone of violence here. 
The implication is that Vitellius’ soldiers forced him to be their emperor because his 
leniency towards them meant that he would be malleable to their wishes.391 Suetonius 
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only made Vitellius an active character after the decision to become emperor had already 
been made for him. Suetonius returned to this negative character trait in a scene which 
shows Vitellius ‘administering not without the council and judgment of the lowest people 
in the theater and race-track, partem non nisi consilio et arbitrio uilissimi cuiusque 
histrionum et aurigarum administrauit.392 As with Tacitus’ characterization of Vitellius 
one can question whether or not following the people’s wishes was actually a bad thing, 
but Suetonius language, specifically his use of uilissimi or ‘most worthless,’ clearly 
shows that Suetonius thought it a bad thing. 
 Suetonius did convey the idea that Vitellius was initially perceived to have the 
potential to be a good emperor, until he fell into corruption: 
egregie prorsus atque magnifice et ut summi principis spem ostenderet, nisi cetera 
magis ex natura et priore uita sua quam ex imperii maiestate gessisset. . . inter 
profusissimos obsoniorum apparatus, nulla familiae aut militis disciplina, rapinas 
ac petulantiam omnium in iocum uertens.393 
 
Once again, Suetonius did not say what he thought Vitellius’ actual character was, merely 
that, at the time, ‘it was hoped that he would display good leadership,’ ut summi principis 
spem ostenderet. It is only when the perception is seen to be shattered that Suetonius gave 
his judgment that ‘in keeping with his nature and previous life,’ nisi cetera magis ex 
nature et vita sua, he ‘turned the rapine and wantonness of all men into a joke,’ rapinas 
ac petulantiam omnium in iocum uertens, in other words he was not only corrupt but 
willfully so.394 This judgment is reinforced by an anecdote which Suetonius alone related: 
that at the battlefield of Bedriacum Vitellius quipped that ‘a dead enemy smelled good 
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and a dead citizen even better,’ optime olere occisum hostem et melius ciuem.395 
Suetonius used both incidents to underline how unsuitable Vitellius was as an emperor. It 
is worth noting that the various reasons which the Flavian’s put out to legitimize their 
civil war against Vitellius might well have furnished Suetonius with a wide variety of the 
anecdotes which he loved to record. However, just as with Tacitus, there is no way of 
knowing how much he was influenced by this, although Suetonius was likely also biased 
against Vitellius because of his father, and the fact that all four authors characterized 
Vitellius thus lends credence to it.396 
 It is Suetonius’ depiction of Vitellius’ final days which best highlights his 
judgment on both Vitellius and the need for a strong character as emperor: 
ac nocte interposita primo diluculo sordidatus descendit ad rostra multisque cum 
lacrimis eadem illa, uerum e libello testatus est. rursus interpellante milite ac 
populo et ne deficeret hortante omnemque operam suam certatim pollicente, 
animum resumpsit Sabinumque et reliquos Flauianos nihil iam metuentis ui subita 
in Capitolium compulit succensoque templo Iouis Optimi Maximi oppressit, cum 
et proelium et incendium e Tiberiana prospiceret domo inter epulas. non multo 
post paenitens facti et in alios culpam conferens uocata contione iurauit coegitque 
iurare et ceteros nihil sibi antiquius quiete publica fore.397 
 
Suetonius clearly characterized Vitellius as too weak to end the civil war, either by 
abdication or suicide, because ‘his spirit was revived by the objections of the soldiers and 
people,’ rursus interpellante milite ac populo. . .animum resumpsit.398 Interestingly, 
despite already characterizing him as passive, Suetonius said that Vittelius ‘overthrew 
and set fire to the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus,’ succesoque templo Iouis Optimi 
Maximi oppressit. He even went one step further and showed Vitellius ‘watching the 
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battle and fire while feasting,’ proelium et incedium. . .prospiceret domo inter epulas. 
Suetonius also implied that the other accounts of the temple’s destruction arose from 
Vitellius’ ‘directing the blame onto others,’ in alios culpam conferens.399 Tacitus, as 
already noted, blamed all of the emperors of 69 together and the destructiveness that 
came with civil war for causing the fire.400 Once more, Suetonius’ focus was on fleshing 
out the character of his subject while Tacitus was interested in making a larger point. 
 Finally, Suetonius’ depiction of Vespasian was very positive, specifically praising 
him for ‘supporting and strengthening the empire,’ imperium suscepit firmauitque.401 
With regard to the civil war, Suetonius characterized Vespasian as acting and planning 
decisively, saying that ‘with the civil war undertaken and generals and soldiers sent to 
Italy, at the same time he traveled to Alexandria,’ suscepto igitur ciuili bello ac ducibus 
copiisque in Italiam praemissis interim Alexandriam transit, which shows Vespasian 
ordering or undertaking several things at the same time.402 He also presaged Vespasian’s 
victory by citing a number of oracles: 
Apud Iudaeam Carmeli dei oraculum consulentem ita confirmauere sortes, ut 
quidquid cogitaret uolueretque animo quamlibet magnum, id esse prouenturum 
pollicerentur; et unus ex nobilibus captiuis Iosephus, cum coiceretur in uincula, 
constantissime asseuerauit fore ut ab eodem breui solueretur, uerum iam 
imperatore.403 
 
Given Suetonius’ interest in perception, these stories were likely ones that were 
promulgated by Vespasian’s supporters during, and immediately after, the civil war as a 
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means of gaining legitimacy.404 Despite mentioning him by name, ‘the prominent 
prisoner Josephus,’ nobilibus captiuis Iosephus, there is no way of knowing whether 
Suetonius was familiar with Josephus or his works. It is entirely possible that the story 
was circulated independent of the Bellum Iudaicum. Tacitus’ account corroborates these 
omens, but Tacitus is more skeptical than Suetonius, although to be fair Suetonius merely 
reported the omens, he gave no indication as to how much trust he put in them himself.405 
 After dealing with these oracles Suetonius then made reference to several 
practical advantages that aided Vespasian in the civil war: 
Plurimum coeptis contulerunt iactatum exemplar epistulae uerae siue falsae 
defuncti Othonis ad Vespasianum extrema obtestatione ultionem mandantis et ut 
rei p. subueniret optantis, simul rumor dissipatus destinasse uictorem Vitellium 
permutare hiberna legionum et Germanicas transferre in Orientem ad securiorem 
mollioremque militiam, praeterea ex praesidibus prouinciarum Licinius Mucianus 
et e regibus Vologaesus Parthus; ille deposita simultate, quam in id tempus ex 
aemulatione non obscure gerebat, Syriacum promisit exercitum, hic quadraginta 
milia sagittariorum.406 
 
Interestingly, only the third item is portrayed as a concrete fact, shown by the indicative 
verb promisi’ with the first depicted as ‘true or false,’ uerae siue falsae, and the second as 
a ‘rumor,’ rumor. Of the latter two, the letter, epistulae sounds like something the 
Flavian’s used to gain legitimacy, saying they were ‘asked to save the Republic,’ ut rei p. 
subueniret optantis, and the rumor was probably piece of rhetoric to stir up the soldiers, 
since the legions would not want ‘Vitellius to change their quarters,’ Vitellium permutare 
hiberna legionum.407 Suetonius artfully mixed fact, perception, and his own opinion in 
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this scene, all the while clearly conveying the factors that helped Vespasian win the war. 
Suetonius’ account contradicts neither Tacitus’ nor Josephus’, while at the same time 
giving Vespasian more agency than Tacitus allowed and making his methods more 
dubious than Josephus would admit. 
 Much like Plutarch, Suetonius’ characterization of various groups at Rome was 
limited, his focus on his subject being tighter than Plutarch’s. Often when Suetonius 
commented upon the plebs he did so only to highlight their reaction to some policy or 
another such as his comment that Galba’s ‘arrival was not pleasing to them,’ quare 
aduentus eius non perinde gratus fuit, or that his policies angered virtually all the classes 
of Rome, per haec prope uniuersis ordinibus offensis.408 Where Suetonius characterized 
the mob as being active participants in events, he characterized them as being being 
fickle and ardently following ‘which way the wind was blowing’ as the following pair of 
quotations demonstrates: “rursus interpellante milite ac populo et ne deficeret hortante 
omnemque operam suam certatim pollicente.”409 “Quibusdam stercore et caeno 
incessentibus, aliis incendiarium et patinarium uociferantibus, parte uulgi etiam corporis 
uitia exprobrante.”410 The first instance here was Vitellius attempt to abdicate the throne, 
but since Vitellius still controlled, nominally at least, Rome ‘the people encouraged him 
lest he depart,’ populo et ne deficeret hortante. The second instance, but a few days later, 
showed Vitellius being led through the streets and being pelted, incessentibus, by the 
same people who ‘even reproached him for his bodily faults,’ parte uulgi etiam corporis 
vitia exprobrante. Thus Suetonius showed the mob being fickle and ardently following 
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whoever was the popular choice at the time, just as Tacitus and Plutarch did in their 
narratives. Uniquely, however, Suetonius did portray the mob as genuinely liking 
emperors such as Otho and Vitellius for their populist actions.411 
 Although he mentioned the Senate frequently, Suetonius only gave direct 
characterization to the Senate once during his entire discussion on the civil war of 69. 
The other mentions were all general reactions, such as has been seen with the plebs, or as 
the object of address for a variety of speeches, or the setting in which certain debates 
occurred. Ironically, despite minimal mention, Suetonius’ lone depiction of the Senate 
taking action made that body seem more positive than either Tacitus or Plutarch. 
Suetonius says: “ut primum licitum est, statuam ei decreuerat rostratae columnae 
superstantem in parte fori, qua trucidatus est.”412 That the senate attempted to grant Galba 
a statue as soon as they were able to, ut primum licitum est, showed that the Senate liked 
Galba, even though the measure was ultimately forbidden by Vespasian, sed decretum 
Vespasianus aboleuit. This attempt, failed though it was, at honoring Galba depicts the 
Senate in Suetonius as actually having and using an independent role in government, in 
opposition to the frightened Senate trying desperately to maintain its role of Tacitus, or 
the weak and easily fooled Senate of Plutarch. This characterization could be seen as 
ironic, given that Suetonius often showed the Emperor performing the Senate’s duty.413 
 On the whole it is Suetonius’ reliance on rumor and perception that makes his 
biographies useful.414 Without explicit judgment from Suetonius it is difficult at times to 
                                                 
411
 Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps, 136-140. 
 
412
 Suetonius, Galba, 23.1. 
 
413
 Wallace-Hadrill, Suetonius, 118. 
 
414
 Wardman, Plutarch’s Lives, 144-145. 
 102
distinguish reality from anecdote, but Suetonius still provided modern readers with a 
good look at how these emperors were perceived at the time, which is useful to have 
given the highly constructed narratives of Tacitus, Josephus, and Plutarch.415 Where 
Suetonius gave judgment, he provided us with an insight into a more Equestrian view of 
Roman politics which focused on how power corrupted the morality of those who 
wielded it and on the actions of the Principes.416 As such, the power of the Principate 
turned Galba’s old age and strictness into corruption and harshness. Otho was a good 
man but too prone to gamble for power rather than working for it. Vitellius was already 
corrupt and lacked the strength either to improve himself or to resist further corruption. 
Only Vespasian had the moral strength to bring the system back under control and rule 
well. There was certainly much which Suetonius ignored or simplified, especially the 
roles of other people besides the emperor, but he still provided a useful and fascinating 
character sketch of the four emperors of 69. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
In discussing and comparing the various characterization of the Roman civil war 
of 69 we have revealed a variety of different viewpoints on the topic. The various coins 
and inscriptions regarding the civil war of 69, and the emperors of that year, provide us 
with a sense of the social and political shifts that took place as a result of the civil war. 
Tacitus provided detailed and complex characterization, but with a distinctly senatorial 
and cynical view, and often used his depiction to make broader points about the 
Principate and what made one capax imperii. Josephus gave the civil war the view of an 
outsider and also provides insight into what the Flavian ‘party-line’ for the war might 
well have been. Plutarch has the view of a Greek intellectual and spun the 
characterizations in his biographies of Galba and Otho into distinct moral lessons by 
focusing on the motives and lifestyles of his characters. Finally, Suetonius presented fact 
and anecdote to provide his readers with a glimpse of how his subjects were perceived at 
the time, as well as giving a more Equestrian view on events with a focus on action and 
administration. 
Rather than being in opposition to each other, as has often been argued, these 
accounts actually serve to reinforce each other. In their narratives of events they are all 
distinctly similar and when they did disagree the two versions are often not mutually 
exclusive. The real difference between these accounts is how each author chose to 
characterize the people and events of the war. Rather than trying to determine which of 
these is ‘true’ or the ‘most accurate’, which is impossible given that such 
characterizations are a matter of viewpoint and opinion rather than fact, we have regarded 
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each as being ‘real’ to its author. Thus each author’s characterization can be regarded as 
their honest and legitimate opinion on the people and events in question, since each of 
their characterizations can be traced, at least in part, to the social group and the career of 
the author. This is not to say that there was not manipulation or outside influence. 
However, the manipulation, where evident, can be traced to a specific reason or point the 
author was trying to make and yet still fits in with the author’s general method of 
characterization. Where there was influence, which cannot be concretely proven in any 
case, each author still showed his distinctive viewpoint. For example, there is clearly 
some influence of the Flavian ‘party-line’ in all of the accounts of Vitellius, and the ideas 
conveyed by the coins and inscriptions of the various emperors are also present 
throughout, but despite being based on the same sources, the characterizations by Tacitus, 
Plutarch, and Suetonius shows distinct differences. 
With these different viewpoints thus established as being distinct and useful, we 
are provided with a more elaborate and complete depiction of the Roman civil war and 
Roman society in general. Just as political leaders and important events in our world 
today are viewed in many different ways, so too would the Principes and the civil war of 
69 have had multiple interpretations. The accounts of Tacitus, Josephus, Plutarch, and 
Suetonius give us four such interpretations. While there is no way of knowing whether 
their viewpoints were unique to themselves or representative of a larger group within 
society, the senators for Tacitus’ and the equestrians for Suetonius’ for example, they 
give us a far more detailed and elaborate portrait of the ‘year of the four emperors’ than 
we would possess if we only had one such account. On top of this, the coins and 
inscriptions that we have further elaborate this portrait with tantalizing hints both at how 
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the participants wished themselves and the war to be seen and at the broader changes that 
resulted from the war. While none of the authors directly identify 69 as being a year of 
social and political change, with Tacitus explicitly opposed to such a view, all of them 
present the year as marking a distinct break in Roman history, specifically that the stock 
of the Principate had fallen to a new dynasty, and as the inscriptions demonstrate, a 
different group of men. This shift could perhaps be part of what Tacitus meant when he 
said: “evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri” ‘the secret of 
empire was revealed, an emperor could be made elsewhere than in Rome.’417 Tacitus was 
specifically referring to the fact that emperors could be made by the army, but there is 
also the fact that one of the main supports for the Flavians was provincial aristocrats. 
What is more, the families of both Tacitus and Suetonius were brought into prominence 
by the social changes wrought by the Flavian victory, which may have influenced their 
perceptions of the war in ways that are impossible to calculate. 
In addition, these viewpoints on the people and events of 69 also reflect back on 
their writers. The choices each author made in his account tell as much about him, and his 
own opinions, as it does about his subject. Although, as has already been noted, there is 
no way of knowing whether or not these authors were representative of the social group 
they were from, it still remains that each author was from a distinctive societal 
background. What is more, all four authors’ viewpoints seem to have particular hallmarks 
of the class they were from. Therefore, these accounts combined with the coins and 
inscriptions, which show a particular social shift, and the messages the various regimes 
felt it necessary to communicate with different groups, allow us to paint a more elaborate 
pictures of Roman society in the late 1st and early 2nd century CE as well.  
                                                 
417
 Tacitus, Histories, I.4. 
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In conclusion, rather than being contradictory and in competition for who was the 
‘most accurate’, the variety of sources which we possess on the year 69 provide the 
modern historian with a variety of subjective interpretations on the people and events of 
the Roman civil war. This variety of interpretations allows us to paint a detailed portrait 
of the characters of the civil war and of the complexities of Roman society thus making 
all of these accounts useful. 
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